Even more important, however, is his substantial critique of Muslim shortcomings, both inside the United States and abroad. In particular, in *Even Angels Ask* he denounces:

* Sub-cultural trends within the American Muslim community, lack of tolerance between Muslim schools of thought;
* dominance of Middle Eastern and Arabic features of merely cultural, not religious, significance;
* over-focusing on non-essential, marginal aspects of the Islamic way of life — instead of looking for the general ethical and spiritual lessons of the Prophet's *Sunnah*;
* systematic distrust shown by "native" Muslims towards contributions by Western converts.

Jeffrey Lang wrote this book "first and foremost" for his children — leading them through the Qur'ān in an eye-opening way and introducing them to the five pillars of Islamic worshipping in a manner which stresses spirituality rather than legalistic routine. In that, he has done a tremendous service once more to all Muslim parents in the United States. All those many who are often wondering, worrying and fretting whether in a permissive, consumerist and drug-oriented society it is possible to transmit their faith to the next generation.

In this respect, the author seems to be somewhat pessimistic. I, however, am inclined to see things in a more optimistic light — if only for one reason: There are now two good books which just might move the scales in favour of Islam in the West. They are called *Struggle to Surrender* and *Even Angels Ask*, and both are by Jeffrey Lang!

*Murad Wilfried Hofmann*


The period which consists of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was an era of radical changes in the Ottoman Empire. The changes that occurred in the economy, education, political and administrative structures constituted a radical shift. The whole structure was like a wagon departing from one place to another. The aim of this essay, taking this context into consideration, is to build a
discussion of the nineteenth century modernization with particular reference to the ideas of Ilber Ortayli and Eric J. Zurcher. The theoretical framework will be taken first in order to provide a broader basis for understanding, followed by a discussion of the Ottoman modernization process.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Modernization is a process which began in Europe during the Renaissance and the Reformation, the eras of absolutism and the early industrial revolution. The Europeans, being the pioneers, experienced modernization as a process of discovery and invention rather than of response and adaptation. The approach of other countries to the challenges of modernization was much more complex, who more often than not, resorted to modernization from a sense of weakness. In this respect, the defenders of early modernization theory, known as the theory of convergence, pointed out that modernization will end up with Western type of organizations, institutions, social structure and Western patterns of individual life. This assertion attaches a certain degree of optimism to modernization.

Meanwhile, modernization mostly spread to other continents through European expansion, namely as a result of colonial rule. The Ottoman Empire was among the few countries which could resist the colonial conquest and thus did not become a colony in the sense of direct rule. The Ottoman State bordered Europe and the competitive advantage of the latter, coming from its tighter social organization and more effective technology, posed a fundamental problem to the Ottoman statecraft. For the first instance, the Ottomans had occasion to question the rationale and foundation of their state. This visible threat and the unique opportunity to question its own weakness came to surface as initial countermeasures in the military, since it was an immediate threat. At this stage the crucial question put on the agenda was: Bu devlet nasıl kurtulur? (How can this state be saved?) This question was so important that it preoccupied the last Ottomans for the last century and a half of their reign.

THE OTTOMAN MODERNIZATION
According to Ortayli, in the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire faced a transition process from a traditional patrimonial state model to a one of modern centralized state. The champions of this transformation were the bureaucratic elite who were in favour of an autarchic, top to bottom way of Westernization. Although its emergence can be traced to earlier periods, the bureaucratic elite of the Ottoman state gained significant power during the Tanzimat era. In Ortayli's view, this new influential elite triggered the radical transition and pursued many reforms in the political, economic, social and judicial spheres of the Empire (Ortayli, 97–98). In Zurcher's view, new bureaucratic cadres ushered in the reforms. The pressure exerted by the new social groups was called into life by the reforms themselves. The new cadres who had certain administrative guarantees against the Sultan and who had been educated in Western type secularist schools, emerged to pioneer the later modernization movement in the Empire (Zurcher, 44–46).

As far as the reform is concerned, the development paved the way for later radical modernization movements that came to light mostly during the
Tanzimat and the first constitutionalist periods. Later these changes simplified the tasks of the bureaucratic elite in these reforms. In 1839 the Imperial Edict known as the Tanzimat Fermanı was declared by the new bureaucratic elite. In this period, the bureaucrats tried to achieve an institutional restructuring of the imperial apparatus. They intended to address main problems that were undermining the social and territorial integrity of the Empire. According to Ortayli, the Tanzimat movement can be interpreted as a legislation movement. By this movement, the initial steps of realizing the sovereignty of law on Ottoman lands and the reorganization of the administrative system of the Ottoman state were taken (Ortayli, 179—180). Tanzimat was important in introducing a new bureaucratic model that worked according to law. This was a clear differentiation from the patrimonial type, servant-bureaucratic model of the Sultanate. Especially with the articles that guaranteed the rights of life and property to the people (ordinary people as well as the bureaucratic elite) and the rights of just and open trial before the courts, the bureaucratic elite became powerful and protected in their modernization mission. These articles were accepted as the \textit{sine qua non} preconditions of a modern state. In addition, the Tanzimat Edict was a landmark in the Turkish constitutionalist movements (Ortayli, 76). These developments together brought a centralized structure of state into being which constitutes the core of the modern state.

In the arena of jurisprudence, a Council of State, the "Divan-i Ahkam-i Adliye" (Supreme Court of State) was institutionalized. Most importantly, the first civil code of the Ottoman Empire was declared in 1870 (Ortayli, 117). During that term, the new administrative reforms aimed to shift the Ottoman legal and administrative system away from the rule of the Sultan to the rule of the law. "Muhasillik meclisleri" (provincial councils) in provinces, cities and districts became very important in making decisions and ruling different organs of the State. These became the forerunners of experiences of parliamentarism in the Ottoman Empire (Ortayli, 129).

Meanwhile, in the nineteenth century, important developments helped to overcome the problems faced by the Ottoman Empire. In this respect, one important development — which also led secularist views to enter into the Ottoman life — was the establishment of Western type, secular military and civil schools. Another was, as mentioned above, the increasing importance of the role of the bureaucrats in the public realm. The attempts of Mahmut II were prominent and triggered a revolution in the education structure. In addition to the opening of new Western type schools, students were sent to Europe to learn culture and technology, and foreign instructors were brought to the schools in Istanbul. This new type of educational system led to the introduction of positivist ideas and it gained momentum after the Tanzimat Edict. In Ortayli's thought, the reforms in education were an important component of reform in the nineteenth century (Ortayli, 136ff). But according to Zurcher, all the new educational institutions created during the modernization movements had to exist alongside the old educational structure as the latter could not be ended completely. This dualist nature of the education system led to only limited success in this part of the reform initiative (Zurcher, 48). In Ortayli's thought, willingness of the Ottoman bureaucracy shaped these policies since they were keenly aware of the required
reforms and consequently they were met with support in Europe. Zurcher, however, points out that both external and internal forces made these reforms possible.

If the centralization is taken into consideration more broadly, the attempts in the fields of economy and politics went hand in hand to achieve this goal, according to both Ortayli and Zurcher. In the eighteenth century Ottoman state, industrial production was local and domestic oriented. It did not have modern production technologies and so was unable to compete with incoming Western industrial products (Zurcher, 17–21). According to Zurcher, the efforts put into action for the sake of filling the above mentioned deficiencies of the state caused the emergence of local landlords against the centralist power of the state, and increased the burden on the shoulders of the agricultural producers (Zurcher, 17–21).

In such an atmosphere, the Ottoman bureaucrats were trying to modernize the agricultural sector and industrial production, and by doing so, were also aiming at reimposing the weakening rule of the state over the economy. In other words, their goal was to centralize the management of the economy in all aspects. If it is looked at from a different angle, there was a vital need for income that would be gained from economic activities in the field of financial reforms. It is obvious that reforms in education, military and other areas required huge resources. With such important motivation, they began their radical changes in the agricultural sector. The Ottoman bureaucrats adopted new arrangements related to property rights on the land. In 1858 a law entitled Arazi Kanunnamesi was brought into force. Later, they allowed the foreigners to own lands in the Empire for the sake of getting new technology and the required resources (Ortayli, 167–169).

The idea of industrialization continued its importance in the eyes of the bureaucrats as one of the vital goals of the nineteenth Century modernization. The industrialization attempts, however, did not become successful and remained unable to reach the projected targets. First, with the industrial revolution and later, with the 1838 Free Trade Agreement, the Ottomans integrated themselves into the capitalist world system. That meant to open their markets to foreign trade and direct European economic influence. This situation created different channels for the Ottoman bureaucrats to finance reforms in progress. As is well known, this situation increased the debt burden and caused the eventual bankruptcy of the Ottoman State.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
As relates to the theoretical framework given at the very outset, in both Ortayli and Zurcher, since the targeted reforms came into existence in the Western world, the above mentioned Ottoman modernization process was regarded as Westernization. Particularly Ortayli’s thought does not deviate much from the classical modernization views that are known as the theory of convergence. In his thought, the Ottoman modernization was a positive development which aimed at progress in the hands of devoted bureaucrats. The new bureaucratic class was preoccupied with the question: Bu devlet nasıl kurtulur? In this regard, two other pillars of this modernization project were the required reforms and centralization.
In both Zurcher and Ortabay, the Ottoman modernization is something like defensive modernization in response to the challenges of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Bulent Aras and Cuneyd Okay