BOOK REVIEWS

Rafi'uddin, Muhammad, FIRST PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION, Iqbal Academy, Pakistan, Karachi, 1961, pp. i-viii+308, price Rs. 10/-

This book, sub-titled "An analysis of the natural and perfect development of the human personality as distinguished from the various forms of its unnatural and imperfect development," claims (Introduction, pp. iv-v) to answer questions which "have not been attempted at all by any modern philosopher of education so far...[namely,]...those relating to the fundamental causes of differences in the educational systems of the various countries and nations and the qualities and features of an ideal system or a perfect system of education."
The whole history of philosophy of education, we are told, has failed to answer these questions, or to work out the full implications of such tentative answers as may have been given (p. v). "The central idea of this book, [of which]...all its other ideas are...implication or...conclusions" is announced as seeking to prove "that education is a process of growth" (p. v.), and that in man, something innate must determine this process of growth at every stage by determining its aim or final end (p. vii).

Hence, the book opens with "the confusion of modern educationists" (Chap. I, title), where the answers of Percy Nunn, John Dewey and James Ross are investigated for the purpose of exposing their shortcomings. This chapter has no conclusion, no summing up—a fact which makes it hard to see how the failure of these three educationists, even if it were granted, is a failure of "all modern philosophers of education without exception" (p. v.), or a proof that "the development of educational philosophy has been seriously hampered and misdirected throughout the world" (Ibid.).

However, Dr. Rafi'uddin's investigation of the three philosophers is far from convincing. By what must be a peculiar logic, he takes Percy Nunn's statement that "if it is lawful to dream of a world in which the good of all would be much (more) nearly the good of each than it is at present, it is lawful to do whatever may help to make the dream (a) reality," to mean that "not only parents and teachers but also the society or more precisely, the state, has the right to curb the freedom of the individual...to enable a particular ideal of life followed alike by the parents, the teachers and the society as a whole to assert itself" (pp. 10-11). By an equally peculiar logic, Dr. Rafi'uddin deduces from Nunn's statement that "nothing good enters into the human world except in and through the free activities of individual men and women and that educational practice must be shaped to accord with that truth" (p. 7) and similar assertions of educational freedom, that "no particular ideal should be allowed to assert itself in the scheme of education" (p. 8). Nunn's theory is thus dismissed as a "self-contradictory" thesis (p. 6), "extremely vague and confused" (p. 11)—charges which may more properly be attributed to Dr. Rafi'uddin's deductions from these statements than to the statements themselves.
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The same judgment, reached by the same dubious, is directed against John Dewey and James Ross. Having thus disposed of ten thousand years of educational wisdom, Dr. Rafuddin is now ready to present "the first principles of education" as he sees them.

Here the logic is that of analogy. Just as the plant and the animal have a natural urge to grow and unless hampered, necessarily reach a stage of perfection which has determined their growth throughout, so has man an innate urge for education which is itself a process of mental growth. Unless misguided by false ideals this urge will lead man to the ideal perfection or self-fulfilment which is his ultimate natural goal (pp. 59-60). Strength and health of the body are as truth and goodness and beauty of the self; disease and debility, as error, unhappiness, grief, nervous disorders and madness (pp. 64-65). Dr. Rafuddin then transforms this simple "as-is" into a positive assertion of fact and concludes that since in biology that which grows is pre-supposed in growth, there must be a self, not identical with the person as conscious, acest understands him, which is the presupposition of mental growth (p. 53). This is obviously a case of the fallacy of imperfect analogy. By the same fallacious reasoning Dr. Rafuddin then concludes from the organism of biological life, that psychic life is equally organic (p. 57); from the analogous fact that a driverless carriage pulled in different directions by a dozen brains cannot move steadily forward, that the self pulled by a dozen urges cannot grow and that necessarily "there is an urge or desire in man which controls and rules all his instinctive or animal urges or desires" (p. 59). Thus, besides being fallacious, the argument commits Dr. Rafuddin to a dualist anthropology. Apparently he is not aware of the progress achieved in psychology in his long struggle against this erroneous and Middle Ages Christianity. The emotions or urges are not "mad dogs" to be tamed by "the soul" or "reason." They do as much taming and compelling as the latter does. "Noble passions" and "sublime thoughts" are not contradiction in terms but meaningful expressions denoting psychic facts of uncontrollable vitality. There is an education of the emotions. When man desires and judges, it is the whole man that desires and judges, not a part of him in separation from the rest.

Dr. Rafuddin then moves on to identify this "ruling urge of man's nature" (ibid.) and mentions, as method for doing so, the gradual striking out of the instincts from a complete list of all man's natural urges and setting the remainder "in order to know which of them rules the rest" (p. 60). However inadequate, Dr. Rafuddin does not do this in front of his readers. Immediately, he emerges from his dissecting camera-scope to announce that the desires for an ideal, for knowledge, for moral action and for art passed the tests with flying colours while all other desires failed (ibid.). The announcement leads one to think that these are really the dual unanalyzable elements of the self. But Dr. Rafuddin reduces them further to a single one, viz., the desire for beauty, identifying Man, knowledge, moral action and art with beauty (pp. 60-61). Is, then, the desire for beauty the most basic element of the self? No, answers Dr. Rafuddin, with a neo-saw reduction of all the desires of beauty to the desire of an ideal. But if they are mutually convertible, are they then equivalent? Not for Dr. Rafuddin who adds, in oblivion to his own
assertions on the same page, that the desire for beauty is subservient to that of the ideal. This attempt at defining man by reducing all his being, life or experience to one single category is the reductivist fallacy. Dr. Raff's analysis might take its place among the other reductivist analyses (man is homo economicus, man is will to power, man is will to pleasure, the world is all ether, the world is all fire, etc.) if it were as well taken and adequately demonstrated as these were in their day. But it can do no more.

Resuming to the notion that the ideal is beauty on the epistemological, mental and aesthetic levels, Dr. Raff's analysis is anxious to attribute to it all the perfection he can imagine. But rather than establish these attributes, he establishes the need to believe in their existence. "A man can love a cow, ugly or imperfect ideal....but only as he can attribute to all the imaginable qualities of beauty...." (p. 65). "...An ideal cannot be perfectly beautiful, admirable and lovable to a human being unless he believes it is the ideal that is perfect (ibid.). Expressions like "he must believe," "any thing that he believes," "if he thinks," "should he think," etc. repeated at every deduction in the converse statement, i.e., in the claim that an ideal is perfect if the subject thinks it so, constitute the condition for the ideal to be in reality perfect! If we rule out the possibility that the author is here talking in empirical terms after the fashion of John Stuart Mill's discourse on the "desired" and the "desireable" being equivalent and interchangeable—which Dr. Raff had rejected in the case of Percy North and John Dewey—the only alternative is that Dr. Raff thinks that the believing or thinking or feeling of a thing to be "a" is evidence, that that thing is so. This is nothing other than the ontological argument which is here asserted at the cost of criticality. It is not the reality of the ideal that is of paramount importance but a belief in its reality. Turning the analogy upside down, he writes, "A belief in the actual existence of an entity which possesses all the qualities of the perfect ideal mentioned above is thus a historical necessity for man" (p. 69).

This "belief in a perfect ideal" occupies Dr. Raff's attention throughout the rest of this book. He identifies it as "a belief in God" (p. 69), characterizes this "Godless" attitude of the educated as due to prejudice and materialism (p. 70 ff.) and then triumphantly asserts that the concept of God is therefore a scientific fact, of the...category to which the atom belongs" (p. 75). Evidently, "science" and "scientific" do not mean for Dr. Raff the empirical discipline that they connote to the men of science. Neither does God mean to him what it means to the ordinary Muslim. That God exists "with all his qualities of beauty, goodness and truth" and hence, as the ultimate ideal of man's ruling innate urge, is, for him, identical with the assertion that "a self-consciousness of the highest beauty and perfection is the ultimate reality of the universe" (pp. 75-80). In these pseudo-scientific, pseudo-idealistic terms, this "self-consciousness" as self-consciousness and not as the God of religious faith, is declared to be "the creator of instincs," "of the human body," "of the universe right from its beginning in the smallest form of matter" (pp. 76-79). The purpose of this creation is self-manifestation: for the striving of the human self-consciousness after the ultimate self-Consciousness is a striving of the latter after itself. This pantheism is declared by Dr. Raff to be the only
philosophy of man and nature which, he predictively assures us, "must become more and more evident with the discovery of new facts in the domains of physics and biology" (p. 76). But perhaps no passage of philosophy could be more unsatisfactory than Dr. Raffa'uddin's proof for this fantastic claim. "...that the Universe is nothing but mind or spirit." he writes. "...is based on the hypothesis that the experience of our mind is the only reality of which we can be certain. It leads to the logical conclusion that the reality of the Universe, if it is anything which can be known by the human mind, must be similar to our own mental experience. Because self-consciousness is the clearest and the highest mental experience, therefore, the reality of the Universe must be of the type of self-consciousness" (p. 78).

The mental experience is the only certain reality is of course denied by the realistic tradition which goes at least as far back as Aristotle and with which a fair portion of Islamic thought has been associated. From this to the position that whatever is known to the mind must be similar to the mind in nature is not a "logical conclusion" but a groundless construction. Finally, the Universe is self-consciousness because the latter is the clearest and highest mental experience is too petty a statement to warrant analysis. Just as the presence of an idea in consciousness has nothing to do with the reality or otherwise of that of which it is the idea, its clarity, height and intensity are certainly no evidence that the universe is made out of such "clear" and "high" idea. A fantastic postulated of "pink elephant" has under this theory an equal right to declare the Universe to be one big 'pink elephant'. The assertion that "the reality of the Universe is a form of consciousness", that the laws of mathematics, being analytical and hence the laws of thought, "are its [the Universe's] ultimate nature" (p. 80-83) comizes Dr. Raffa'uddin to a metaphysical consciousness-pantheism. The assertion that "God and man...have the same moral qualities and attributes [because...God and man are both self-conscious]" and self-consciousness commits him to an ethical pantheism. 'Man, the final product of the evolution of the Universe' was there at its very inception, "in the form of the self-consciousness of the Universe" (p. 86).

After all this, it does not help to deny that "God is immanent to man and the Universe as the pantheists believe" (p. 87). The evidence Dr. Raffa'uddin adduces in his own defence consists in another analogy, viz., that of the artist to the work of art. The artist, he tells us, is both "apart from the picture that he creates" and "in the picture with the whole of his personality" (ibid.). This is in principle the case with God, the Creator, and man, the creature. Apart from being only of Western art, this analogy does not alter the fact that because "self-consciousness alone is beauty and nothing beautiful or worthy of love can possibly exist outside it...the ideal which it begins to love—whether it is the Perfect Man as is the case of the Divine Artist, or it is the perfect picture as in the case of the human artist, is really a mirror which reflects its own beauty" (p. 89). Far from satisfying man's ethical will, the pursuit of self, with whatever ringing names it may be called, does not even begin to be ethical. With the bad conscience such a blunder in morality evokes, Dr. Raffa'uddin defends his pantheism in terms which clearly recall Tertullian's arguments for the trinity God who is one and not three, and three and not one, all at once. He
writes: "Thus self-consciousness by its very nature divides itself into two parts, the knower and known, the lover and the beloved, the creator and the creation, the seeker and the sought. These two parts of self-consciousness are accurate and yet not separate from each other. They are distinguishable and yet belong to a single indivisible personality. They are, moreover, not separate compartments of the same mind [of self-consciousness] but each of them is the whole mind. A self-consciousness is something which is capable of projecting itself beyond itself into a created otherness which is no other than itself and nothing beyond itself without altering or dimming itself or losing its oneness or oneness or likeness in the lesser" (p. 88).

Chapter III is a discussion of the psychological theories of McDougall, Freud, and Adler and the theory of religion. This, or course, is not directly relevant to "the First Principles of Education" which began as a discussion of the ought-to-be ideal of all education. Psychology of education is a study of the how not of the what, of education; and Chapter II might have better fitted in another work, perhaps a second volume to the present one where it stands obviously mal-digested. With this belongs the following chapter, "The Nature of the Educational Process" (Ch. IV), which is equally a discussion of the how of education. In conclusion, however, is telling. "All education is endocentric" (p. 211) "academic freedom...is therefore a myth, a self-deception and an illusion" (p. 215). "What matters," Dr. Raffaelin observes his readers, "is not the educator who desires his pupil to keep his judgments correctly not to assure that they are formed without any ideological bias... but to assure that they are formed entirely under the ideological bias of a single ideology..." (pp. 216-7). But this is a complete reversal of the Islamic stand that Islam is a rational religion whose truth is critical truth that is always and everywhere demonstrable, "given" no more than the laws of thought and the "given" of experience. Dr. Raffaelin stands at the farthest remove from his ancestors who faced the pages of Mecca, the Jews of Madina, the Cretins of Jerusalem and the Cretins of Persia with utmost spiritual defiance and self-reassurance. Instead of exulting them and advocating the idea in the state of people which was at the back of their defiance, Dr. Raffaelin prefers to treat the path of the Europeans who began to resign ideology only when their own people had given way to doubt and scepticism. Indeed, the need for ideology, or Idealism, is itself a symptom of this deeper dying disease from which the Muslins, unlike the Westerners, has every reason not to suffer. The spiritual structure of Islam is not the dark, irrational, mysterious, "wali"-hidden member at the door of which the faithful take off their shoes. Dr. Raffaelin advocates the will to ideology and nothing more, as if the ideal, the self-consciousness of the Universe, once acknowledged, proclaimed, and willed, will do all the work that has to be done by itself. This follows, as we have seen, from the assumption that the ideal is necessarily creative and the one creative, it is self-receptive. His remark that "there is every truth in the Biblical saying that "God is Love" (p. 128) and that this "love immutes itself in the process of its growth as a result of the self's experiences not only internally...but also externally" (p. 203) betrays the direction of his inspiration. The
only ethics that such a view allows is, as Western Christian doctrine had found out, "proclamation of the news of God's inevitable self-recreation; a proclamation which can be answers at the part of man but not with moral striving but only with a polite "Thank You!"

Be all that as it may. However interesting these issues may be, they do not properly belong to a philosophy of education which, as Dr. Rai'uddin tells us in the Introduction, is to overcome all question of the end of education. The burning question is, What is the like or into which man is to be moulded? What is the type of man that Islam seeks to mould and to cut in this world? So far, this book has been preoccupied with other problems. Only in the last chapter do we come face to face with this question but only to be disappointed with the results.

"A perfect educational system," Dr. Rai'uddin answers, "is one which enables a community to love the perfect ideal, see. God...and to order all aspects of their natural activity as human beings in accordance with the demands of that love" (p. 231). But God is here only a name religion given to the ideal. Another name of the ideal gives to it by philosophy is "Self-consciousness." Neither of these is instructive and the question therefore remains, what is the nature and content of the perfect ideal?

First, Dr. Rai'uddin tells us that a really perfect ideal of education will, if followed and perfectly realised, issue in perfectly good, true and beautiful life, (p. 277) which is true though platitudinous. Then he goes on to say that the perfect ideal is the most comprehensive whole within which all-experience is explained and understood (p. 245), which is a call but irrelevant claim. Further, he deprecates reason as incapable of giving us any certain knowledge of such whole (p. 249 f.) and advances the view that feeling or intuition is the faculty which does lead to certainty regarding itself (p. 219). Even theoretical sciences is asserted as certain only to the measure that it uses this faculty, see. intuition, in explaining the ultimate reality of the world (pp. 258-59). Finally, Dr. Rai'uddin tells us that the perfect ideal of education, the content and end to which education should lead is "Self-Consciousness" (p. 256), the same spiritualistic, pantheistic "All-Powerful Creative" ex machina we met earlier in the book. That is the answer to all questions and passages to all difficulties. It is the task of the educator to cause everything in and inside the curriculum to fill the mind of the student with its all-oneness and beneficent presence (p. 257), to rewrite the text-books of chemistry, arithmetic, biology, physics, engineering, and all the humanities so that the student hears and reads none other than this refrain (259-69). This new school-book is to act as the role principle of knowledge, of beauty and of morality. By agreeing or disagreeing with it, the scientific and mathematical propositions and the moral and aesthetic judgments become "true and false" (p. 266). Finally, in a fit of unparalleled boldness and ill-temper, Dr. Rai'uddin avails any science as such and, in tune with the revolts of German Nationalism, declares that all knowledge is as such and by nature, only a tool in the hands of this or that ideology (p. 267). Then follows the exaltation that since it is "perfectly natural for any ideological community" to "constrain all science and all knowledge to unconscious ideological preconceptions in the name of knowledge and science itself" and since "as a matter of fact no development of science and knowledge can take place in the right direction which is not in the
service of the Perfect Ideal’ and hence, of ideology (p. 285), we too, ought to transform education quickly into an endotraining machine, prescribing all didactic literature and rewriting all textbooks so that the one ideology of Self-Consciousness alone is expressed and served (p. 285).

Regardless of whether they are actually rash and unthinking enough to follow Dr. Raffadall’s pronouncements on science and educational psychology or serious enough to discard them as insipid, whether they are like him finically addicted to ideology or modestly reconcile its place in today’s world, the pagan Hindu, the trinitarian Christian, the socialist Jew, and the Muslim can all accept his “First Principle of Education” while remaining in every sense true to their “ideologies.” Indeed, all the philosophers of education, including those whom Dr. Raffadall had sought to refute, might well accept this one principle of education, Self-consciousness, without any prejudice whatever to their divergent doctrines. That is so because Dr. Raffadall has not assigned to his “first principle” any content at all whatever philosophical or religious. As regards the post Muslim educator who struggles through this massive verbiety with the hope of finding new meanings in religion and to guide his most diversified all vocations, he will come out not a jot the wiser.

Finally, a work must be said about the form of this book. It has neither a detailed table of contents nor an index. Its quotations, which are extensive in size and number, often covering whole pages, are not properly documented and acknowledged. Indeed, not a single quotation is assigned the full name of its source book, page number and author as well as the publisher, place and date of publication. There are also numerous typographical errors.

SMAIL L. A.-FAUQI


This is the third work of his kind published during the last few decades portraying the hitherto neglected social, economic, cultural and religious life of the Muslim masses of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. Muslim historiography in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent has hardly evolved around the person of the ruler, his courtiers, the nobles and gentries of the empire or sometimes even the quatrains and couplets, but the people at large were completely ignored with the exception of those who either rebelled against the established authority and consequently suffered the penalty of death, or in one way or the other influenced the masses, promising them a better life, thereby becoming a potential danger to the State and a challenge to religious tyrants and outcastes.

A Pakistani Civil Servant—Mr. S. M. Ikram’s three-volume Indo-Pakistan (Ah-i-Karthe, Rul-i-Karthe and Mawri-i-Karthe), published for the first time in the early forties, was a pioneer study in the field of cultural, social and religious history of the Muslims of the sub-continent. His work blended the trait and opened up new vistas for a study of the life of the Muslims as a whole and their social evolution as a religious but dominant minority in a land where Islam, as a new social system, had to make compromises with certain local uncoordinated custom. There was a long gap between the publication of Ikram’s study and the appearance of the second work—incidentally the first in English—on the same subject by

KABACHI
Dr. Muhammad Yasin of the Lucknow University. His study entitled "A Social History of Islamic India" (1958) is the product of the mass in which he is living and a reflex of the troublesome times through which the Muslims of India (Bharat) are now passing. More than anything else this thesis has been written with a purpose—the exploitation of the Two-Nation Theory which gave birth to the Mehdigah State of Pakistan.

The present study by Prof. I. H. Qureshi, though it overlaps the same field and goes over more or less the same story, is, however, a class by itself. It is marked by balanced views, faithful narration of events, painstaking research, and thorough scholarship. The author opens his story with the advent of Islam in undivided India and the surroundings which had nothing in common with the environments in which Islam was born and flourished. Gradually unfolding the panorama of how this new monotheistic religion gained a foothold in this land of polytheists and idolaters, how it spread into other areas of the vast subcontinent and how the Muslim community was born and integrated into a single sociological unit, the author plunges into the scene where orthodoxy begins to develop cracks and is contested with the converse, both faint and loud, of heterodoxy.

It is a masterly analysis of the causes that led to the emergence of the Muslims of the subcontinent, "divided at the basis of doctrine, speaking different languages and descended from different racial stocks", as an integrated community. Dr. Qureshi aptly remarks that the main credit for creating a feeling of unity among the Muslims must go to Islam. His statement in the same context that "the Muslims of the subcontinent would not have been welded into a well-integrated community if they had not been drawn together by various other forces in addition to their religious belief" (p. 45) sounds not only contradictory but controversial. The fact remains that in spite of the "various other forces" which might have devoted them long ago, the Muslims of the subcontinent were able to maintain and preserve their separate entity as a distinct religious community only by virtue of their holding fast to the "one of Allah"—the religion of Islam—which stood as an unassailable barrier between their heathen past, with all its semi-scientific attachments, and their present and future, with all their vicissitudes and uncertainties.

Talking of heterodoxy and the challenge that is posed to orthodox Islam in the subcontinent, Prof. Qureshi strangely enough characterizes the rise of the "Mahdi", Sayyid Muhammad of Jawaher and his Movement as "a reaction against the false and deceptive spiritualism practised by certain charlatans who pass as the "guides of the faith" (p. 231). Neither Sayyid Muhammad himself nor any of his biographers, followers or devotees ever made such a claim. In fact, there is no evidence to believe with the author that the Mahdi's rise had anything to do with the "rise of charlatans who scandalously cultivate a reputation for supernatural powers and then exploit the credulity" (p. 233). The author also seems to have been misinformed in describing Sayyid Muhammad as a "prophet professed" (p. 134) as the "Mahdi" never adopted teaching as a profession nor did he ever set up a madrasah. It is also difficult to agree fully with the author that "through orthodox opinion was opposed to him (Sayyid Muhammad), yet Shabki Abd-ur-Rahim, the traditionalist of Delhi, has the highest praise for him, which is surprising" (p. 234). Perhaps the learned author will again be surprised
to note that the Ṣayyid 'Abd al-Haqq Mubāhīḥ writing of Ṣayyid 'Ali al-Mu'azzazī, author of the Kanz al-Imān, on that after claiming to be the Mahdi and subsequently recanting, he was a number of times in the city of the Mahdawīs and the 'īdādi (miscreant; instigation to rebellion) of this heretical sect. Says the Ṣayyid:

Another statement of the author that "Ṣayyid Muhammad meant with such vigorous opposition to his claim of being the Mahdi that he decided to leave Jumāma" (p. 134) is also without foundation. Sayyid Muhammad for the first time proclaimed himself the Mahdi at Mecca in 901/1505, the second time at Ṣamādūṣt in the mosque of the Khān Shīrāz in 904/1507 and the third time at the Ḥabīl near Māţar in 905/1509. On all three occasions he went away from his home-town of Jumsūmī where he had made no such claim. The contention, therefore, that he was compelled to leave Jumāma due to the vigorous opposition of the orthodox Ulama falls to the ground. It has merely been supposed that it must have so happened, without making an attempt at consulting the original Mahdawī sources. A secondary source, and by no means a reliable one, like the account by Phr. Blochmann (see ifrād) should not have been tacitly followed. The Mahdi's departure from Jumāma is in accordance with the principle of 'ibādāt in which he was not only a staunch believer but which he had raised almost to the status of an article of faith with his followers. He himself set the example by going from place to place as he did on the occasion of his pilgrimage to Mecca in 901/1505.

Like many of his predecessors, Dr. Qureshi has also fallen into the error of pontificating the sand-stirring account of the moral sufferings of the two devoted followers of the Mahdi, i.e. Miya 'Abd Allāh Niyāzī and Ṣayyid 'Abī, giving little thought to the fact that these two persons had no hand in shaping the destinies of the Muslims of India or even slightly affecting the course of history. Apparently, the task the author set himself was to assess the impact of certain religious movements on the life and thought of the subcontinent. Dr. Qureshi, however, seems to have chosen not to bring out the significance of the activity of the two Mahdawī leaders but, like the general run of historians, has been content with the moving account of their sufferings. To set that these two circumstances "won many enemies for the political power of orthodoxy" is a rather far-fetched conclusion totally out of tune with the facts of history. Neither of these two men was ever owned by the Mahdawīs. One of them 'Abī Allāh Niyāzī, after the grueling experience that he went through, not only completely renounced Mahdawīs, repented but even denounced the Mahdi. If the same line of argument is taken, the assertion of Qureshi, the nakhl Sīflī, during the reign of Sunghārgh, that of Masūm al-Waljī, of Sīh Aḥmad al- Ḥishāb, of the seventy Suyūṭīs (Jānī), by the order of 'Abī b. 'Abī Talib
will be regarded as having shaken the foundations of orthodoxy, which is, to say
the least, a travesty of truth.

Writing of Abd Allah, Nizyad and his regeneration of Mahdism, the author
says that he "gave up his beliefs because it was reported to him... that Sayyid
Muhammad had himself repented some time before his death" (p. 136). I have
not been able to trace the source of his information nor has he himself cited
any authority in support of this assertion. None of the Mahdawi or non-Mahdawi
sources known to the reviewer even obliquely mentions this fact. The world
of scholarship will be under a deep debt of gratitude to the author if it is proved
that the Mahdi of Jawziyat has repented before his death, thus easily patching
the rubble of Mahdism. The author, however, seems to have relied on a statement
by Blochmann (Intro. to the English translation of A. S. A. A. J. of Calcutta 1919,
vol. I, p. xxxii, fn 1), quoting Badruddin that, during a meeting in Sind, where
Nizyad had permanent quarters after his chishtayen, the latter confided to
Badrudin that before his death Sayyid Muhammad had repented. Had this been a
fact, it would have been widely circulated and commonly known throughout the
country. This statement of a 'renegade,' therefore, must be rejected or at least
taken with a grain of salt. Badruddin also seems to have misread it without
investigation and criticism from a person who was certainly prejudiced and feel-
ing much mortified after his distance.

Dr. Grewal's treatment of Akbar's waywardness and his deviation from
orthodox Islam leading to his 'inquiries or experiments,' to use a felicitous
expression of the author, shows objective study and merit consideration. He
has covered this hitherto path with a skill and freshness that calls for
admiration. His assessment of the achievements of Shabah Ahmad Sindhvi,
as a religious reformer and the impact of his movement on the minds of the
Muslim peoples, is not only balanced but sound and accurate. The chapter
devotes to Shabah Waliy Allah Dihlawi, his successors and followers, their
significant achievements and failures, is one of the best so far written on the
subject.

The story of the Muslim struggle for freedom, first from the churches of the
Sikhs and the British and later from the tenacles of the Hindu political
agitanus, has been told in an inimitable and charming style peculiar to the
author. The dispatch of Mr. Wade, the then British Political Agent at Lodhiana, throw-
ning (new) light on the tragic end of Sayyid Ahmad Shahid and the cremation of his
dead body by the brutal Sikhs, although first discovered by Mr. Aslam Siddiqui
(vida 'Islamic Culture', October 1946), has been duly noticed. The time has now
come when the story of the Meujahidin, followers of Sayyid Ahmad Barqawi,
was told in greater detail in English and other foreign languages, thus remor-
ing the grave misinterpretations created by the distorted writings of authors
like W. W. Hunter and the compiler of the Harvaro Distrrict Gazetteer.

The last three chapters of the book deal with matters of comparatively
recent occurrence which basically form a part of contemporary history. It is too
early to give an objective and dispassionate account of these events as the personal
prejudices and inclinations of the author, apart from the insufficiency of the
source-material, are bound to manifest themselves even from under the
heaviest burden, notwithstanding the Nationalist Muslims of India, who did
not favour the partition of the country, there is no gainsaying the fact that the only way of saving the Muslim community from total annihilation, after the withdrawal of the British, was the establishment of Pakistan, their separate homeland where they could live according to their lights.

On the whole this good scholarly study of the social, religious and cultural history of the Muslims of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent down to the establishment of Pakistan, their national homeland and the apotheosis of their political aspirations, makes very delightful reading. Fidelity of expression, lucidity of thought and the dexterous marshalling of facts, are a distinguishing feature of this work. Even where the language has become rather racy it has not been allowed to disturb the placid flow of the current of history. The book successfully fills a vacuum in the historical literature of Muslim India and is a sharp reminder to writers on Indo-Muslim history that there are still many fields, hitherto unexplored, which await their attention.

This otherwise elegantly produced book n, however, marred by a number of typographical errors (for instance on p. 63, para. 2 lines 3, 5 and 12; p. 257, para. 1, line 10: p. 287, para. 1, line 17). Similarly the following incorrect couplet of (74)%:

"کتو نقل و نقل میں قلم علم کی تر خدا کا سے من و سے من خدا کا سے".

appearing in a footnote on p. 122 (although, the missing word "کتو" after "قلم علم کی تر" was duly pointed out to the author before the publication of the work), has been allowed to stand as it is, for reasons best known to him and the printer. The system of transcription employed is rather unconventional in spite of this and some other slight defects, more than offset by an extensive bibliography and heavy documentation, so indispensable in a piece of research like the present work, will remain an authority on the subject for a long time to come.

KARACHI.

A. S. BAZMEEN ANSARI

Muhammad Tahir Siddiqi, STUDIES IN ARABIC AND PERSIAN MEDICAL LITERATURE, Calcutta 1959, pp. xlviii+137, price Rs. 2/-.

The amount of information contained in this book is a great credit to the erudition and scholarship of its author. Dr. Siddiqi seems to have consulted all books relevant to the subject, analyzing, compiling and correlating his data with considerable skill and sound judgment. He writes with conviction and interest, springing by his manner of treating his subject that he appreciates and admires Arabic Medicine.

The book was originally meant to be an introduction to a modern edition of an ancient Arabic compendium of medicines, the Firdaws al-Hilum, by 'Ali b. Rabbah. The book and its author are not well-known in the U.A.R. and we are very grateful to Dr. Siddiqi for his analysis of the book and his learned discussion of the life and works of 'Ali b. Rabbah. This is undoubtedly the best part of the book. Otherwise the great merit of Dr. Siddiqi's work lies in the fact that it offers to the serious student of the history of Arabian Medicine a wealth