experiences but not from its basic principles and values, since ideology cannot be separated from the values of a system.

Since the text has not been published with the translation, it is difficult to say anything about its precision. Whatever we could compare from the cross-references given in the footnotes, the translation was found a masterly and meticulously exact rendering. The annotation is elaborate, explaining the difficult terms and giving cross-references of the text to various other authorities, as we stated earlier. Had the translation been published with the text, it would have been more beneficial from the research point of view.

The name of the Companion ‘Abd Allāh b. Abī Awfā has been shown as ‘Abd Allāh b. Abī Awfī (pp. 91, 293) which must be a printing mistake.

The book provides an excellent study of the early Islamic law of nations as introduced by the eminent scholar of the second century of the Hijrah and the author deserves the deepest gratitude of all the students of Muslim law and jurisprudence for this.

RAWALPINDI

AHMAD HASAN


This standard work on the Caliphate was first published in 1924 when the ḥilāfah question was very much alive and agitated the Muslim mind a good deal. The work has long been out of print, its republication now with an additional chapter on the aftermath of the abolition of the Caliphate would therefore be welcomed by students and scholars of Islam.

The author begins his treatise with a discussion on the similarities and dissimilarities of the Holy Roman Empire and the Caliphate in order to delineate the nature and special characteristics of the latter and discuss in perspective its origins as well as its theological sanctions in the Qur’ān and the Sunnah. “Unlike the Holy Roman Empire, the Caliphate,” maintains Arnold, “was no deliberate imitation of a pre-existent form of civilization or political organization. It was the outgrowth of conditions that were entirely unfamiliar to the Arabs, and took upon itself a character that was exactly moulded by these conditions.” As a political institution, it was thus “the child of its age” (p. 11).

With the rise of the Umayyads, the institution of Caliphate underwent a radical transformation. Election to the office was now sometimes secured by force and fraud and became crystallized into a sort of legal fiction. Under Byzantine influence, the caliph became a sort of “king”, one Heraclius following another, and the Caliphate “a kingdom characterised by violence and tyranny” (p. 107); at its best it was an Arab hierarchy dominated by the powerful Umayyads, and guided by narrow tribal sympathies.

In 750 A.C. the Caliphate passed on to the ‘Abbāsids after the battle of Zāb, and for five long centuries “each successive Caliph was a member of this family” (p. 55). Beyond “the substitution of a Muslim kingdom for an Arab kingdom”, the rise of the ‘Abbāsids did not mean any significant change in the
character of the institution; if anything, greater evils now crept in, disfiguring the institution all the more. By the tenth century, centrifugal forces, nourished and sustained by racial, linguistic and tribal antipathies, had eaten sufficiently into the concept of an universal ummah with the Caliph at its head, to enable the establishment of a rival (Umayyad) Caliphate in Spain and the rise of independent dynasties not only in the peripheral provinces, but right in the "solid core" of the Caliphal realm, in Egypt and Syria and in Persia; more significant (and tragic?), the rival Shi'ite Fatimid Caliphate in Cairo (which enjoyed immense wealth and power as against the miserable decline of the 'Abbásids in Baghád) even "flaunted the claim of the 'Abbásids of the headship of Islam" (p. 84). In the result, the Caliph's authority "hardly extended beyond the precincts of the city of Baghád, and the Caliph himself was at the mercy of his foreign troops, for the most part of Turkish origin, lawless and indisciplined" (p. 57).

The Caliphate had both a spiritual and temporal significance; therefore, the decline in its temporal authority was sought to be offset by emphasizing its spiritual significance all the more, and beyond all proportions. Yet denuded though he was of practically all mundane authority, the Caliph had still a vital role to fulfil: he could legalize the possession of dominions acquired by force or fraud, or both, by usurpers or, in some cases, by one of the rival claimants to the throne. And in the popular eye the caliphal sanction seemed to mean a good deal. In any case, the 'Abbásid Caliphate carried on a miserable existence till 1258 when it was provided with a tour-de-grace by the Mongol holocaust under Halaku.

The Ottoman Sulţan came to assume the title especially after the conquest of Egypt by Sulţan Selim I in 1517 when the last 'Abbásid Caliph, al-Mutawakkil, had solemnly transferred it to him, although the previous Ottoman Sulţans—and even Selim himself (as early as 1514)—had styled themselves variously as "Khalífah", "the greatest of the most eminent holders of the Caliphate", so on and so forth. In any case, and interestingly though, it was only when the temporal power of the Ottoman Sulţans went into decline that they, like their 'Abbásid predecessors, thought it politic to put up the claim, increasingly and seriously, to a spiritual Caliphate, and this in order to use the office as a lever to wrest concessions from Western powers and Russia which held sway over areas with large Muslim populations. And because there was a Pope in Christendom, and the Russian Czar was usually considered the custodian of the Eastern Church, these Western powers (and Russia) could not long resist the acceptance of the Ottoman Caliph-Sulţan as a sort of Muslim Pope, holding spiritual sway over and deeply concerned with Muslim populations elsewhere.

But the Ottoman Sulţans' claim to be the spiritual leader of the entire Muslim world, maintains Arnold, was untenable in the light of the classical theory of the Caliphate, its origins and its development down the ages. He even disputes the Ottoman Sulţans' title to the office on the basis that they could not claim descent from the Quraysh, a prerequisite for any aspirant to the office in the classical theory, and even recognized by Muslim medieval philosophers like al-Máwardí.

One of the aims of the book was obviously to show how the position of the Caliph in Islam is not coterminous with that of the Pope in Christendom, and
thus to release the Western powers from their previous recognition of such a status for the occupant of the Sublime Porte. So far as the classical theory is concerned, a *prima facie* case may be made out against a purely spiritual Caliphate, but the point here is that the institution had at least since the later 'Abbāsids come to acquire a specifically spiritual character, and the Muslims, whatever the arguments to the contrary, refused to disabuse their minds from endowing the institution with such a character. The mounting concern among huge segments of Muslim population in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, in Egypt, in the Dutch East Indies and elsewhere about the fate and future of the Caliphate since the beginning of the First World War through the iniquitous Treaty of Sèvres (1920) during the Turkish War of Independence to the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) shows how much integral a part of their religion did the Muslims consider the continued existence of the Caliphate to be.

And this was not inexplicable either. For, as Arnold himself points out, the institution provided for them "an ideal of some form of political and social organization in which self-realization may become possible for them in some system of civilization that is Muslim in character and expression" (p. 183). That is why when the institution was unceremoniously abolished by Kemal Ataturk, a wave of mental anguish and consternation swept across wide areas of the Islamic world—which was ably and picturesquely caught, among other things, in the wire sent jointly by the Central Khilafat Committee and the Jami'at-ul-'Ulama'-i-Hind on 11 March 1924—and two world conferences, one in Cairo and another in Mecca, were called to explore the possibility of re-establishing a new Caliphate. It is another thing that the proposal failed to consummate for want of both a really suitable candidate and unanimity of opinion.

It is, nevertheless, interesting to note that the title was tentatively offered to Kemal himself by the Muslims in India and in Egypt, but the iron-willed father of modern Turkey declined it with thanks. Kemal's reply, so characteristic of his pragmatic and utterly realistic approach, is worth noting. "You know that Caliph signifies Chief of State," he said. "How can I accept the proposals and desires of people who are governed by kings and emperors? If I shall declare myself to accept the office, would the sovereigns of these peoples consent to it. The orders of the Caliph must be obeyed and his interdiction submitted to. Are those who want to make me Caliph in a position to execute my orders? Consequently, would it not be ridiculous to rig me with an illusory role which has neither sense nor right of existence"? (pp. 223-24; from Kemal's marathon speech to Grand National Assembly in October 1927, later published as *A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal, President of the Turkish Republic*, Leipzig, 1929).

These later events are ably summed up by Sylvia Haim, a noted student of Arab nationalism, in her concluding chapter on *The Abolition of the Caliphate and its Aftermath*. In one sense, this chapter is supplementary to Arnold J. Toynbee's discussion in *The Islamic World Since the Peace Settlement* (which covers events up to the end of 1925); but writing about this cataclysmic event some forty years later, she speaks from a position of vantage. Of special interest is her discussion of the unsigned, semi-official Turkish document, translated by Abdul Ghani Sani, Turkish Consul in Beirut and official spokesman of the Grand National Assembly,
and published in *al-Ahrām* (Cairo) in 1924, along with a preface by the author; this document which argued for the abolition of the Sultanate (i.e., for the clipping of the temporal wings of the Caliphate) on the intellectual plane was meant to prepare public opinion for the next step—viz., the abolition of the Caliphate itself. Haim's account is also more balanced (especially in regard to the efforts of the Muslims of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent for the continued existence of the Caliphate) than that of a modern Turkish apologist: Niyazi Berkes (*The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, Montreal, 1964).

The discussion is supplemented and clarified by several valuable appendices on such allied topics as the Shi'ah and Khawārij doctrines of the Caliphate, the alleged spiritual powers of the Caliph and popular uses of the term *Khali̇fah*.

The present work is perceptive, scholarly and authoritative; though, as we surmised earlier, the author's implied purpose is to make out a case against a purely spiritual Caliphate, the author's viewpoint is not forced on the reader, but emerges out as an unavoidable conclusion of his discussion and arguments which are on the whole tenable and far from forced. In any case, the merit of the work and the sincerity of the author are aboveboard. Indeed, it would be no exaggeration to say that this is the only definitive work of its kind on the subject in English.

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