of the emergence of the New Political Order under Field-Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, he says, "the great relieving feature of the recent developments in Pakistan is the fact that the rise of a military regime in Pakistan was not accompanied by any rise of an authoritarian doctrine" (p. 293). In a nutshell, the philosophy underlying the new political order is "to blend democracy with discipline". He concludes: "Fate of democracy in Pakistan as in many other parts of Asia and Africa depends on the development of a strong and sound foundation among the people" (p. 295).

The book which makes a comprehensive study of the history of parliamentarism in Pakistan is not only useful to the experts but also to students and the general reader. Surely it must draw the attention of the academic world.

Solecisms like 'datas' and 'machineries' mar an otherwise well-produced book. We hope these minor errors will be removed in a future edition.

KARACHI

MANZOORUDDIN AHMED

IQBAL'S GULSHAN-I RAZ-I JADID AND BANDAGI NAMAH, English translation with explanatory notes by Bashir Ahmed Dar, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 1964, pp. 77.

Gulshan-i Râz-i Jadid (New Garden of Mystery) and Bandagi Namah (Book of Servitude) are the last two philosophical mathnawis of Iqbal's famous Persian work Zabûr-i 'Ajam which otherwise consists primarily of ghazals (lyrics). The ghazal portion of Zabûr-i 'Ajam is already known to the English-reading public through a translation by Professor A. J. Arberry under the title Persian Psalms (1948). With B. A. Dar's rendering of the two poems in question the English translation of Zabûr-i 'Ajam now stands completed.

Iqbal wrote Gulshan-i Râz-i Jadid in answer to the Gulshan-i Râz of Mahmûd Shabistarî, an eminent mystic poet of Persia (c. 1250—1320 A.C.), whose thinking, in the normal tradition of Sufism, is strictly pantheistic and quite typical for its ascetic bent. It is believed that this mode of thought, particularly as it has flourished in Muslim history, was given added impetus by the unspeakable ravages and atrocities suffered by the Muslims at the hands of the Mongol invaders in the 13th century. Mahmûd Shabistarî himself was a witness to the cultural chaos that followed the fall of Baghdad in 1258. His Gulshan-i Râz, therefore, is as much of an echo of the mood of the time as it is an appreciable contribution to mystic literature. It speaks eloquently of the unity of all Being, of the illusoriness of physical existence and thus of the merit of self-abnegation and resignation.

That Iqbal had developed a strong antipathy for this way of thinking is most clearly indicated by the contents of Gulshan-i Râz-i Jadid. There is no denying the fact that his own thought exhibits unmistakable mystic tendencies. But he was at the same time a rebel of the mystic tradition. For his mysticism purported to be personalistic and dynamic instead of being pantheistic and passive, and he advocated positive self-sufficiency as the norm of human conduct rather than the self-abnegation of traditional mysticism. Here was, therefore, a truly jadid (new) approach to an old mystery.
In *Gulshan-i Rāz-i Jadīd* Iqbal has raised and answered nine questions as against the fifteen (and not twelve as Dar suggests in his Introduction, p. vi; see Edward G. Browne, *A Literary History of Persia*, vol. iii, 1956, p. 147), which constitute the *Gulshan-i Rāz* of Shabistanī; but he has dealt with essentially the same metaphysical problems as did the latter, i.e., the nature of thought, of the physical world, God, the human ego, and of the relation between God and man, etc. Now the attitude of a mystic toward these extremely difficult problems may look rather simplistic but it is by no means easy to refute the mystic world-view without incurring the risk of inconsistency. If, for example, one grants Iqbal’s thesis that Nature or the physical world does not present itself to God as a confronting ‘other’, and that ‘it is a structure of events, a systematic mode of behaviour, and as such organic to the ultimate Self,’ (*Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Lahore 1960, p. 56; cf. also *Gulshan-i Rāz-i Jadīd*, Q. 3), then one cannot agree with his further contention that the Qur’ānic verse “God is the light of the Heavens and of the Earth” (XXIV : 35) implies the Absoluteness of God and not His Omnipresence, (*Reconstruction*, pp. 63-4; *Gulshan*, Q. 3, lines 9-10). For, surely, to say that X is organic to Y is already to allow that X is integrally related to Y and hence inseparable from it. Consequently, on this thesis also, God would have to be thought of as Omnipresent, somewhat in the same sense in which a traditional mystic means it.

A similar difficulty exists in Iqbal’s treatment of man’s relation to God (cf. *Gulshan*, Q. 4). If the world, as we have seen, is organic to God, then man, who is obviously a part of it, cannot claim to possess a distinctive ego. But, believing as he does in the egohood of man, Iqbal tries to resolve this difficulty by reference to the two Qur’ānic terms of ḥalq and ‘amr, the former denoting the relation of the material world, and the latter of the human ego, to God (*Reconstruction*, p. 103; “Self in the Light of Relativity” in *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal*, 1964, p. 113). He immediately adds, however, “I confess I cannot intellectually apprehend this relationship (of ‘amr to God) ...”

At this point, the observations made by the translator himself, whose explanatory notes are otherwise highly valuable, would also seem to be rather confusing. In explanation of Iqbal’s position on the above problem, he says: “To Iqbal, who is an advocate of pluralistic theism, separation of the temporal and eternal is not only an actual fact but is a real blessing and necessity. Without this distinction neither the One nor the Many would have significance and value in the economy of life” (p. 33). Now as far as the present reviewer knows, Iqbal never used the words “pluralistic theism” to define his own philosophy; this phrase is at best ambiguous. A more accurate way of describing his metaphysics would be to call it “spiritual pluralism” to which he himself clearly subscribed (see *Reconstruction*, p. 72). And then what of “the economy of life”! The point is that it is already quite difficult to grasp the intricacies of Iqbal’s thought without our trying to make the understanding of it more problematic.

As regards his translation, Dar has shown considerable skill and acumen in conveying the spirit of Iqbal’s poetry in an idiom which is not native to him. Indeed, some sections of it would compare favourably with as brilliant a translation as that of Arberry’s. Yet it is not altogether free from serious
weaknesses. Dar's excessive use of the pronoun 'it' to render both the nominative case of ۵ and the accusative case of the pronominal termination ۶ often confounds the meaning of a verse. Besides, one notices at times the inevitable rigidity of literal translation which seems to be the result of his anxiety to remain faithful to the original text. But the more serious weakness is perhaps to be found in instances where he either misapprehends or misinterprets a Persian term, for the subject-matter we are dealing with is strictly philosophical and even the slightest slip in translation can cause grave misunderstandings. The following are a few illustrations from Question 2 of Gulshan-i Rāz-i Jadid. Lines 11 to 14 of this Question read:

11. It is satisfied with its privacy and is not inclined to association with others.
12. Yet all things are illuminated by its light.
13. First it brightens it up.
14. Then it ensnares it in a mirror.

Attention is drawn here particularly to lines 13 and 14 of both the Persian text and the translation. Whereas the pronominal termination ۵۶ of ۵۷ in line 13 of the text correctly corresponds to the subject of line 12, viz., ۵۸, the second "it" in line 13 of the translation does not cohere in the same manner with "all things" in line 12. In the phrase ۵۹ in line 14 of the text the ۵۱۰ ۵۱۱ ۵۱۲ ۵۱۳ deceived Mr. Dar who completely misunderstood the term, presuming it to be derived from ۵۱۴ which does mean mirror, while it is in fact derived from ۵۱۵ which means law or regulation. For whereas "ensnares all things in a mirror" makes no sense in this context, "ensnares all things by a law" has profound philosophical implications. The idea, of course, is that all things are endowed with individual existence, but they are also subject to the necessity of law. Then his rendering of line 20 of the same Question, ۵۱۶ as "For every existent depends for its existence upon our perception", is not only inaccurate but also misleading, because ۵۱۷ means merely "under obligation to a perceiving eye" and there is no implication in it that the existence of anything depends on perception as such. In fact, the problem involved here is that of knowledge and not at all of existence; and it is quite clear from the given context that Iqbal, in his own peculiar way, is a supporter of Kantian epistemology rather than subjective idealism. (See Dar's own remarks on the subject on p. 21: "This idea, as expressed in poetic form in lines 21-42 of the text, has led certain critics to think that Iqbal denies the objectivity of Nature. As a matter of fact, what it purports to do is not to destroy its
OBJECTIVITY BUT TO REFUTE THE THEORY OF MATTER OR SUBSTANCE PUT FORTH BY NINETEENTH-CENTURY PHYSICS.)

Despite what has been said above, translating Iqbal is, both from the point of view of the beauty of his language and the profundity of his thought, a no mean task. Dar’s effort, therefore, deserves to be commended in every respect.

KARACHI

RAFIQ AHMED

NOTICES

Nicholas Rescher, AL-FARABI, AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962, pp. 54, price $4.95.

Al-Farabi’s contributions to philosophy and to the sciences, indeed, demanded a handy but useful bibliography of all the works written on or concerning al-Farabi.

Professor Nicholas Rescher, Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, deserves our congratulations and gratitude for bringing out this excellent bibliography of al-Farabi. A versatile genius as he was, al-Farabi exerted immense influence on both the Jews and Christians in medieval times. The Muslims themselves felt very much indebted to him for understanding not only the philosophy of Aristotle but also the ideas of Plato and other Greek systems of thought through his writings. He is generally described by the Muslim scholars as “al-Mu‘allim al-Thani”, the Second Teacher, considering him only second to Aristotle. Avicenna—al-Shaykh al-Ra’is, the Chief Shaykh—acknowledges frankly that he failed to understand the Metaphysics of Aristotle even by going through it for more than forty times and could understand the work only through al-Farabi’s Commentary on the work which he happened, per chance, to see in a bookseller’s shop.

Very few treatises of al-Farabi have, indeed, been so far critically studied either in Europe or elsewhere. The contribution of Muslim philosophers in general and that of al-Farabi in particular have, no doubt, remained thus far unestimated. Only a few of the works of al-Kindi, al-Farabi, Avicenna and Averroes have received the attention of the scholars of the day.

al-Farabi, as appears from the account given by the early biographers, wrote two types of Commentaries of the Philosophy of Aristotle—(1) Commentary and (2) Annotation. Maimonides popularized the works of al-Farabi among the schoolmen who studied them with great interest and preserved them in their Latin translations and even in Hebrew.

Professor Rescher’s bibliography is, however, preceded by the work of Ahmed Ates, entitled “Farabi bibliografyası” which appeared in Türk Tarih Kurumu Beleten (Ankara), vol. 15 (1951), pp. 175-92. In this bibliography Ates has listed all identifiable works of al-Farabi and given data on manuscript locations and editions, where possible. Another bibliography of the works of al-Farabi was published by Max Joseph Heinrich Hottan as early as in 1905 under the title “Das Buch der Ringsteine Färabis. Mit dem Kommentar des Emir Isma’il al-Verseini el Färanî”, vide Zeitschrift für Assyriologie, vol. 18