European languages. One is made aware that the author is speaking from "within" the tradition and has "tasted" what he is discussing and that his knowledge of these matters is not simply from books. Here, the most universal aspect of Islam is elucidated and many comparisons made with other traditions.

As the author concludes: "In all these considerations it has been our aim not to give a picture of Muslim esotericism in its historical development, but to bring it to its most elemental positions by connecting it with the very roots of Islam which are of necessity its own. It was not so much a matter of recapitulating what Sufism may have said as of saying what it is and has never ceased to be through all the complexity of its developments. This way of looking at things has enabled us—perhaps to the detriment of the apparent coherence of this book—to dwell at some length on meeting points with other traditional perspectives and also on the structure of what is around us as well as within us—both divinely human and humanly divine."

The book, despite a few minor errors, is well printed and translated in an excellent manner. There are a few changes from the French text which the author has apparently made specifically for the English edition.

Altogether this work is one of the most important ever written on Islam in any European language and in our opinion is the best introduction to Islam as a religion and way of life. As such it can be of great service to Occidental readers who through it can come to understand what Islam really is. Moreover, it can render a great service to those modernized Muslims, who have lost touch with their own tradition, and who, through the reading of this precious work, can be led to rediscover the principles of Islam and understand the tenets of their faith.

TEHRAN

SEYYED HOSSEIN NASR


This another work by Dr. Montgomery Watt is lucid and highly suggestive in content. Not only that; Dr. Watt is also remarkably liberal in his approach to the issues he has raised. Indeed, it sounds like the voice of a man who is genuinely concerned about the well-being of humanity at large, who wishes to see "a single integrated community of all mankind" (p. 171). But he feels, and rightly so, that there can be no world-unity without religion (pp. 3, 175). For "a genuine unity demands a community which is charismatic, that is, which has a transcendent origin and carries transcendent values" (p. 175). Although Watt speaks as a Christian (p. vii), yet the religion he has in mind, the one which is to serve as the basis for world-unity, may not necessarily be Christianity in its present form (p. 166). It will be a religion containing a "universal" set of valuations and "taking up in itself all that is truly valuable in the existing sets of valuations" (p. 164). Such a religion, if it ever becomes a reality, will be the product of what is known as the condition of "inter-religion". To this question we shall return presently.

Watt has also analysed the various aspects of religion in general in the light of current developments in sociology and psychology. His sociological
standpoint seems to indicate that a religious change is usually preceded by an economic or material change (pp. 15, 16). For material changes have social repercussions, that is, they produce a state of discontent, which then leads to the emergence of an "ideation" (a set of "directive ideas") or a new religious system as a reform movement (p. 25 ff.). All directive ideas are consequently "interest-linked" and liable to be distorted (pp. 39, 42, 43). And if this is what the assertion that religion is the opiate of the people implies, then even the "quasi-religion" of Marxism (p. 77) cannot be free from distortion because its own ideational basis is unfortunately also linked with party-interests (p. 40).

Sociological analysis reveals further that all religions are in danger of falling into three types of distortions: isolationist, inflationary and fixational (pp. 51-55). These distortions, which are common to individuals as well as communities, ensue either from a feeling of insecurity and insignificance or from an exaggerated sense of one's own superiority to others (pp. 55, 59). But mankind are moving toward a situation in which such defensive attitudes shall no longer be desirable. Great religions particularly shall have to prove their worth in practice, for "the new situation of 'inter-religion' is showing that . . . intellectual defences are far from impregnable" (p. 2). What is required is a thorough 'house-cleaning' as it were, and an earnest drive for "sublimation" (p. 166 ff.)

From the psychological point of view, Watt has presented a penetrating answer to the assertion that "God is a projection" (Chap. VII, passim). To begin with, the idea of deity in religion constitutes a "dynamic image",—one of those images which form the central core of a religion (p. 110). But in so far as this image represents a psychic need of man—a need for dependence in respect of the origin and preservation of life (p. 114)—it may be considered a "projection". Now the question is whether this "projection", like the dynamic images of mythology, is a "projection into thin air" or whether it is "a projection on to a bearer". Watt is of the opinion that, unlike the projections of mythology, the dynamic images of religion are projected on to a bearer (p. 112). And an appropriate bearer of these images is the phenomenon of life, which he admits is "a legitimate speculative development of the thought of Jung" (p. 137), especially his conception of the collective unconscious. Thus "it is Life that makes us what we are: we cannot make life in any way . . . (It is) the creative power immanent in our lives and indeed in the whole evolutionary process . . . Clearly life transcends the individual and also the whole human species" (pp. 135-136). We may, however, object that (a) Life in the abstract does not "exist": what exists is individual things. But even if it be granted that Life does exist in some sense, then (b) the "bearer" still does not correspond to the "image". Life, after all, is neither a friend nor a father nor yet a judge—but all these functions are definitely ascribed to the deity.

Notwithstanding his admirable attempt at defending religion sociologically and psychologically, Watt, in his enthusiasm to "accept the assured results of science", commits the same mistake as the learned religious thinkers have often committed, namely, of reading the intellectual fashions of the day into their religions (cf. Walter Kaufmann, Critique of Religion and Philosophy. New York,
Thus, for example, when he quotes the New Testament in support of his concept of Life (p. 137)—"All that came to be was alive with his life" (John, I, 3) and "I am life" (John, II, 25), etc.—he seems to be imposing an artificial interpretation on the Scripture. He fails to realize that the Scriptures are not meant to be scientific documents, and that the propositions of religions refer strictly to prophetic and moral phenomena. Indeed, a religion does not have to accept or reject the results of science. Religion and science clearly move on two different planes. Hence it is purely arbitrary to assert that "to abandon the effort to achieve integration (with scientific knowledge) is to renounce all claim to be a world-religion" (p. 71). On the moral plane, the question of such an integration does not arise; for the results of science may change but the moral import of religions shall for ever remain the same.

Now since Watt, by his own admission (p. 1), has selected Islam particularly for various illustrations in support of his argument—treating it strictly "as an object of study"—it is only in order that his treatment of some of the Islamic ideas be briefly examined in the same spirit. It must be said in all fairness, however, that there is no attempt at deliberate distortion in his treatment of these ideas, even though he has suggested no corrective to the distortions that already exist in the minds of most Europeans and has, in fact, tacitly accepted them to establish his thesis. Take, for example, the idea of marriage in Islam. Commenting on it Watt says, "We (Europeans) tend to think of Islam as..., easy-going in its sexual ethics" (p. 1), and "Islam is associated with polygamy" (p. 90; cf. also p. 103). The first thing that is to be noted in this connection is that Islam was not responsible for initiating the institution of polygamy—this institution, as we all know, is a very ancient phenomenon. Islam simply recognised it as a part of the existing social conditions at the time of its birth (and, as a matter of fact, placed a limit on the unrestricted number of wives which was customary in those conditions). For, as Watt himself admits, "the more strictly religious concern, in contrast to the ethical element, is with society and its solidarity" (p. 93). Thus the existing social conditions had to be reckoned with if Islam was not to remain a mere set of moral postulates. (Watt seems to be quite aware of this problem when, in talking about the Christian missionary work in Africa, he says: "The missionaries in general have failed to realize that monogamy worked in Europe only because certain social conditions existed there and that these conditions did not yet exist in Africa; thus, for many Africans, European monogamy did not 'work', and so they refused to adopt it, clinging instead to the traditional practices which 'worked'"—p. 91). But recognition of a social phenomenon does not constitute a 'command' or 'duty'. To ignore this would amount to blurring the distinction between 'What is' and 'What ought to be'. Surely if it is justice that an 'ought' or a moral 'command' guarantees, then the Qur'an does say specifically that the best way "to avoid injustice" is to have only one wife (IV: 3)—and that is what should be considered a duty.

Another aspect of Islam to receive comment from Watt is the place of revelation in the Islamic community. "The idea of revelation," he says, "may be allowed to be a proper part of the ideational basis of Islam, but at certain points it seems to have been distorted through the exaggeration of its importance." He then lists two such instances of distortion: (a) "revelation is regarded as the
sole source of the Islamic community and its culture"; (b) "the Qur'an is considered as a source of historical truth superior to the normal historical channels" (p. 44). Now the first assertion implies, of course, that Islam does not acknowledge its indebtedness to other cultures (cf. p. 57). And this is simply not possible. Great cultures have never grown in complete isolation from each other; there is invariably an inter-action between cultures at some stage of their development. But the fact is that Islam has affirmed its relationship with other cultures from the very beginning. For if religion is an integral part of all cultures, then, in acknowledging its fundamental link with the former monotheistic religions, Islam has also acknowledged its indebtedness to the cultures which found their nucleus in those religions (cf. the Qur'an, XLII: 13). As for the second assertion, one must understand that what is important about the contents of revelation is not their "historicity" but the message inherent in them. Historicity may indeed be utterly irrelevant to the merits of that message. For what is revealed is not history but a religion. It would be erroneous, therefore, to put too fine a point on the historic accuracy of the Qur'anic revelations; we should rather view them in the context of the moral and spiritual import.

We may now examine Watt's views about the phenomenon of "inter-religion". "Inter-religion" is a term being applied to the fact of a global mixing of contemporary religions and the resultant struggle for supremacy among them. And since "the quest for integration in the world community inevitably leads to religion" (p. 161), the final outcome of these developments may depend largely on the emergence of one world-religion. But "each religion is entrenched in its own defensive ideation" (p. 163) and possesses its own culture-bound form. Hence each consists of only a "partial" set of valuations. The one world religion, however, shall have to include a "universal" set of valuations such that it may take up "within itself all that is truly valuable in the existing sets of valuations" (p. 164). The more a given religion approximates this universal set of valuations the worthier it shall be of claiming the allegiance of the whole of mankind. "In particular men will look to see which religion helps them most as they try to cope with the problems of living in this vast world society" (p. 163), and the religion which is best able to modify and adjust itself to this demand is most likely to be successful.

But there are, unfortunately, some very serious problems inherent in this thesis. For example, how are we to decide what is "truly valuable" in the existing religious valuations without any objective criterion? And yet, according to Watt, "there is no objective intellectual criterion for sets of valuations any more than there is one for religions" (pp. 164, 63). This problem, he suggests, can be solved in terms of the "fruits" of individual religions (pp. 11, 146, 163). But, then, who is to be the judge of these "fruits", and by what standard? There seems to be no way of breaking out of this vicious circle even empirically; for there may by strength in numbers, but numbers alone would surely not prove the "success" of a religion. Practice, too, must justify itself on the basis of some intellectual content.

In point of fact, to say that "there is at least some truth in all religions" (p. 6) is already to presuppose that there is an ultimate truth. It would be absurd, however, to think that ultimate truth could be exhausted by social
and environmental adjustments. On the contrary, these adjustments should take place in the light of that truth if they are to have any value-significance. Nor can truth be divided into small shares such that we could collect those "partial" shares and build a "universal" whole. We must, therefore, admit either that there is no truth in the religions, or that each religion reflects the same truth from a different angle, though some religions might do so more clearly than others. Hence only that religion shall be the religion of humanity which mirrors the truth most clearly.

There is, however, no proof or disproof for such ultimate issues. Yet if the truth is to triumph, men shall discover that one religion—perhaps it is, in the last analysis, the question of the maturity of man's consciousness. In the meantime, the existing religions must relax their prejudices against each other and let there be unity in diversity, a greater community of great religions. After all, as Watt very rightly says, "in the present world situation the great religions, whether they realize it or not, are allies against the opposing forces" (p. vii).

KARACHI

Nabih Amin Faris, THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE ARTICLES OF FAITH (a translation with Notes of the Kitāb Qawā'id al-'Aqā'id of Al-Ghazzāli's Iḥyā' Ulūm al-Dīn), Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Kashmiri Bazar, Lahore, pp. 144, price Rs. 8.00.

Dr. Nabih Amin Faris, Professor of Islamic History at the American University of Beirut, Lebanon, has already won some fame in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent through his English translation of the First Book of the first quarter of Imām al-Ghazzāli's Iḥyā' Ulūm al-Dīn published under the title "The Book of Knowledge", by Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf of Lahore in 1962.

Dr. Faris himself states, "the idea of preparing a translation of the Iḥyā' Ulūm al-Dīn of al-Ghazzāli originated with Professor Hitti". This may be so only in relation to America and the Middle East. Dr. Faris, however, deserves our congratulations for undertaking the translation of the Iḥyā' which has, at least, caught the attention of the modern Orientalists after a long time. It is somewhat curious that after influencing St. Thomas Aquinas (in his Thumma) the Iḥyā' should cease to attract European scholars for a number of centuries.

The Muslims have always held this work in high esteem. In the nineteenth century Sayyid Murtadā al-Zabidi wrote a commentary in ten volumes on this famous work of Imām al-Ghazzāli. This encyclopaedic work has already seen an abridged Persian version as well an Urdu translation which succeeded in popularizing al-Ghazzāli's views among the peoples of the Persian and Urdu-speaking regions.

The Iḥyā' Ulūm al-Dīn consists of four parts, each containing one-fourth of the book:—(1) al-ʿĪbādat, worships, (2) al-ʿĀdāt, habits, (3) al-Muhlikiyyāt, the destructives, and (4) al-Munajjiiyyāt, the deliverers. In 1952, Edwin E. Calverley, perhaps for the first time, published an English translation of the first part entitled al-ʿĪbādat under the title Iḥyā', the Book of Worship, together with a commentary and an Introduction. A free translation of some extracts of the