It should also not be ignored that the exigencies of situation sometimes warrant an *ad hoc* strategy which has to be discontinued as soon as that exigency ceases to exist. But these *ad hoc* measures do not qualify to be termed as an independent economic system. In a purely Western capitalistic economy scarcity of food may call for rationing. A war may warrant conscription, ban on some imports, seizure of properties for war purposes, ban on air travel, forcing the factories to prepare war-material and curtailing of rights and freedom. These extraordinary measures may continue for as long as the extraordinary situation continues, without being considered a new economic system.

The diligence and talent of the authors in bringing together the apparently heterogeneous elements to draw conclusions shows that they could have made a more creative contribution had they relied upon only primary sources.

S.M. Hasanuzzaman


The author seems competent to write on the subject undertaken as has been acknowledged by Seyyed Hossein Nasr in his Foreword to the book.

The book combines the Emanation Theory of Neo-Platonism and in this line of Neoplatonistic-Platonic-Aristotelean Muslim Philosophers like Ibn Sīnā and the thoughts of Muslim mystics like Ibn al-‘Arabī, Ḥallāj Maḥṣūr, and above all, he follows the doctrines of Ishrāqī (Illumination) School as founded by Shihāb al-Dīn Suhravardī and his later exponent Mullah Sadrā. His purpose is to justify mysticism on philosophical and rational grounds. This he claims to find in Ishrāqī epistemological doctrine of *Knowledge by Presence*. In his opinion the real knowledge can only be gained through *self-awareness* or what he calls "apprehension by presence". That is, feeling one's own existence or existential states is true knowledge; knowing is equated with the feeling of existence. (One may profitably bring in the knowledge of Bergson's Duration or Vital Impulse, or Iqbal's knowing of self to further illustrate the knowledge by presence, although the author does not mention them.) The author appends the metaphysical theory of emanation of Plotinus and the Muslim philosophers including Ibn Sīnā which constitutes a large part of Muslim philosophy. In this
theory of emanation, from God or Ultimate Reality, outflows or outpours a series of beings in 'logical' succession or, in other words, in some 'necessary' causation (no temporal succession), and the lowest rung of the ladder is our world of things and beings. Human Active Intellect is such an emanation of Divine Intellect, where, for instance, logical laws and Platonic Ideas inhere. By knowledge of presence we succeed in reaching God's knowledge and in a special sense of identity through presence we become identical or one with God. For this practical achievement we need to have a mystic's trance or a sufi's intuition and sufi's way of reaching Reality. This all is a way or system of Illuminative Philosophy (Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq) of Suhrawardī Maqtūl, often called Shaykh al-Ishrāq. Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq is his most famous work, and as the very word Ishrāq (illumination) suggests, we need such mental illumination as sufis may refer as e.g. jalwah in their illuminative trance. The author appears to hold himself (not merely expounding) to this Ishrāqi philosophy or system or hikmah, which is a combination of Metaphysics of Emanation, Epistemology of Knowledge by Presence, and practical ethico-religious code of mystics to attain this actual divine illuminative knowledge. In my opinion the arguments offered by the author on all these three counts are erroneous, and hence his whole Ishrāqi edifice is misconstrued and cannot be rationally justified.

The weakness of the book does not lie in exposition or elaboration of Ishrāqi doctrines, but in arguing and presenting philosophical arguments in their favour. In his epistemological contention he fails to visualize any form of real knowledge except that acquired by correspondence and by presence. He thinks that external objects can be approached or supposed to be known through their corresponding mental ideas or images or concepts. Hence, his starting point is like that of John Locke (in fact that of all the British Empiricists of eighteenth century) that we are directly and immediately aware of our own ideas, and some of these ideas are supposed to really represent or correspond to external objects and their actual qualities etc. In such a representative theory of perception we are permanently and necessarily debarred from having access to the reality. So what is left is "presential knowledge", for which he himself gives the example of feeling of pain. He forgets that the real source of our knowledge of external objects lies in our meeting and overcoming resistances, through interaction and mutual influencing. We thus discover or realize that there are centres of resistances and activities. The fact is that the real source of our knowledge of ourselves also lies in this realization: we come to know ourselves when we meet resistances and act and interact. Hence, even in our knowledge of 'presence' or by presence (call it 'Ilm al-Ḥadūrī) the original source is this realization of confrontation. Again, he is completely mistaken in justifying metaphysically 'the knowledge by presence' as emanation from ultimate divine source. He simply assumes that in order to know something, that thing must be in the mind. As external physical objects cannot be in our minds, neither the redness of an external object reddens my mind, the only alternative he could find was 'presential knowledge' for which he got the support from emanation theory.
That is, our intelligence is emanation of ultimate reality which could also inhere the logical truths and Platonic Universals or Ideas (to match common words or concepts) for which he had sufficient Muslim philosophical tradition from Plotinus. The author says: "It is not the case that P exists in S's mind which is certainly equal to: it is not the case that S knows P".

Now, knowing does not necessarily imply that the known is in the mind. One may know an object by confrontation, by meeting or realizing the resistances. He criticizes Russell's sense-data that if they are not in mind (i.e. mental) how could we know them! Now, it is not a truism, nor the analysis of knowing demands, which the author just assumes so. One may visualize Russell's type of 'neutral sense-data' or 'physical sense-data' in the sense of electro-magnetic impulses (neutral though dependent on body as compared to Locke's mental simple ideas) with which our mental acts come into confrontation. For example, we are told by neurologists that our memory is preserved in protein-particles in the nerve-cells. And can't we say that these particles or electrically charged waves in the brain are objects of our mental acts of knowing? It appears, the author is obsessed with finding validity for Platonic ideas and for logical rules, which he finds in our Active Intelligence as emanation. He forgets that the facts discovered about biological evolution have shattered such views and indirectly any view of such metaphysical constructions as emanation. We do find certain important glimpses of intelligence in higher animals. And Wittgenstein's views on logic and on general words or ideas have destroyed Platonic Ideas. The author's views on mysticism or sufism as a way to achieve 'presental knowledge' are also ill-founded. He himself admits feeling-tone as essential cornerstone. Now, any sort of feeling can be attached to any sort of cognitive idea through conditioning in a culture; the feeling of fear can be affixed or riveted to ghosts, lions, persons or events. He says that there is also cognitive element in mystic emotional trances. Yes, it is true, but there is no definite and particular element for the same sort of emotions. He is wrong in saying that mystics all over the world have some common cognitive element. In fact mystics differ in their cognitive apprehensions: their differences lie in the different weltanschauungen, in their religious approaches of looking at things in particular ways. Again, when he talks about presental knowledge of pain, he, like Ducasse, forgets to keep in view the distinction between sensations which are subjective having feeling-tone and sense-perceptions which are certain objective references of perceptions. Their logical behaviours are different: when we are in pain our mental states are painful as something is predicated of subject (S-P form); but when we perceive something extended or something red, our mind or mental states are not said to be extended or reddened. In the latter we have confrontation and so a certain relational logical bond appears. Again, we may sometimes be missed about our own immediate feeling-tone e.g., about the feeling of pain. We may feel that there is pain in the medial side of arm, although the actual pain is in the heart. This sort of phenomenon is called 'referred pain'. Only through scientific researches by combining and integrating
various sorts of sense-experiences into a certain system or theories, we come to gather and know the truth. It is ultimately the 'Harmony Theory of Truth' which prevails in our gathering and systematizing knowledge and in seeking the truth.

Again, compare the following assertions and note the degree of knowability involved: "I am experiencing pain", "I know this pain", "I realize what is pain", "I know the nature of this pain", etc. According to 'knowledge by presence', the knower, the act of knowing, and the known, are integrated one and they are all identical. Even in the case of sensations, e.g. pains, there are degrees or depths of knowing and soon the question of knower, act of knowing and the known could be distinguished and highlighted. It is, no doubt, of psychological interest and an important segment of reality to elaborate what is called 'knowledge by presence', knowing of self by Bergsonian intuition, etc. But knowing all this will have to be harmonized and be fitted in a greater perspective of reality.

I have tried to examine some of the central points of the author's thesis. Whatever I have said in criticism must not underrate the importance of the book. As far as the exposition of Ishraqi wisdom and philosophy is concerned it is a real contribution. Critically because the author is in full sympathy and in agreement and argues philosophically for Ishraqi philosophy. The objectionable thing is that the author regards the knowledge by presence as '[t]he principles of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy'. It is really not right to refer to it as 'Islamic Philosophy'. He should have rather said: "These are the views of some Muslim philosophers including the author". It is not proper to describe such views of some of the Muslim thinkers as 'Islamic' or 'Islamic philosophy'. They may be described as the philosophy of a certain Muslim thinker or of a Muslim school.

Intisar-ul-Haque