

## THE *JIHĀD* AND THE FORMATION OF THE SOKOTO CALIPHATE

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### INTRODUCTION

For an understanding of the *Jihād* led by Shaykh `Uthmān ibn Fodiyo<sup>1</sup> and how the Sokoto Caliphate was formed in the beginning of the last century, we need to understand the situation in Northern Nigerian before the inception of the *Jihād*. This is necessary if we are to appreciate the contributions made by the *Jihād* leaders in the development and the spread of Islam in the Western Sudan (West Africa) and the establishment of a coherent Islamic government that survived for a whole century up until the British colonization at the beginning of the twentieth century.

### NORTHERN NIGERIAN AREA ON THE EVE OF *JIHĀD*

By the second half of the 18th century, the once powerful state of Kanem-Borno was faced with numerous problems that reached their climax in the 19th century *Jihād* movement, and culminated in the demise of one of Africa's oldest ruling dynasties — the Saifawa Dynasty. The problems were compounded by the decline of Kanem-Borno's military effectiveness which has been attributed to the neglect of its professional corps, both in terms of training and preparedness, and also in the use of fire-power, especially the deployment of muskets in battles which had, for more than one occasion, carried the day for Bornoan forces in the past. Thus, by the turn of the 18th century, the once dreaded army of Borno had turned into

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its former shadow.<sup>2</sup> This military weakness encouraged some of Borno's dependencies to assert their independence. Some dependencies like Bagirmi were so courageous even to challenge the authority of the metropolitan Borno by raiding Kanem, Lagone and the southern parts of the metropolitan Borno.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, the Taureg raids of the northern fringes of the empire were intensified and in 1759 Borno lost the control of Bilma Salt mines and consequently the Trans-Sahara trade routes to Ahir. These raids coupled with the rise and expansion of Wadai into the Bahr al-Ghazal region occasioned serious demographic movements which compounded the problems facing Borno at that time.<sup>4</sup>

Both the Shuwa Arabs and the Kanembu, like the Fulani, are pastoralists. The late 18th century crisis forced them to settle in the Western and southern shores of Lake Chad,<sup>5</sup> thereby increasing the pressure on the available grazing land and exacerbating the possibility of conflict once they came into contact with the autochthonous groups who were mostly sedentary farmers. The Manga people were also affected by this population movement as they were forced to abandon their settlements on the northern fringes and moved into the metropolitan Borno and the States of Sosebaki.<sup>6</sup> The social pressure brought about by these demographic movements culminated in a number of revolts in most of the seriously affected areas. Thus, as pointed out by John Lavers,<sup>7</sup> these demographic movements within the metropolitan Borno engendered a general feeling of insecurity and distrust of the government.

Another vassal state which in 18th century had remained a thorn in the flesh of Borno was Mandara, which, with the help of both the Fulani and Shuwa Arabs, successfully revolted against the suzerainty of Borno.<sup>8</sup> Military attempts to coerce Mandara into obedience proved disastrous and on one such occasion in 1771, the Borno army was personally led by the reigning monarch, Mai `Alī. In this campaign it was said that the bulk of the army was routed and the Mai abandoned to his fate.<sup>9</sup> In the reign of Aḥmad ibn `Alī (1791–1808) the crisis in Borno reached its climax. In 1800 the Tauregs destroyed the theocratic state of Gaskeru which Borno helped to establish as a buffer zone, while local revolts within Borno continued; both Bedde and Ngizim continued to harass the Borno militarily.<sup>10</sup> In 1805 while the *Jihād* movement in Hausaland was under way, the Dayama of Daya (one of the district heads in Borno) revolted against the authority of the Mai. With active connivance of the Fulani settled around Daya area, especially Goni Mukhtari, the Dayama was able to resist the Bornoan army.<sup>11</sup>

Borno faced several decades of constant warfare, raids and revolts which Borno faced towards the end of the 18th century. All this created, by the beginning of the 19th century in the Bornoans, a population of

sullen and war-weary people. Thus, by 1805/6 when the Sarakunan Hausa (Kings of Hausaland) appealed to Borno for military assistance against the *Jihādists*, the Bornoan army, weak and exhausted, was already too feeble to contain even its own problems. This appeal gave the few disciples of Shehu Usmanu Danfodiyo in the area the courage to extend the *Jihād* and open a new sector in the metropolitan Borno. The *Jihād* was enthusiastically supported by a large number of the Fulanis settled around Borno and who had, for a long period, felt estranged from the government of the area.<sup>12</sup>

### **RISE OF ZAMFARA AND GOBIR**

In Hausaland, the 18th century saw the rise, first of the state of Zamfara from a second rate to a first-rate power, and later also that of Gobir. The rise of these states, though situated in the western part of Hausaland, had repercussions throughout the region. Zamfara, which was first to emerge, was able to secure its independence only very lately and even then with difficulties. However, its independence was tenuous and its dominance short lived. With the destruction of the power of Kebbi in the last decade of the 17th century through combined assault by Zamfara, Gobir and Ahir, Zamfara was secured from a major inhibiting power in the name of Kebbi. This gave Zamfara a leeway for action in the area. The metropolitan areas of Kebbi consisting of its capital city of Surame, Gangu and Leka all came under its control.<sup>13</sup> But for a rising power this was not enough. Attempts to expand northward and eastward only brought it into conflict with some of its powerful neighbours: the sultanates of Ahir, Katsina and Kano.<sup>14</sup> Though it has been said that in the first half of the eighteenth century war was at the forefront of Zamfara policy with its internal and external policies coming under the surveillance of military chiefs,<sup>15</sup> it never had the wherewithal to turn military victories into permanent gains. Several expeditions embarked upon during the reign of Sarkin Zamfara Faskare (1702) against both Katsina and Kano, like the storm which they were, simply withered away without any significant gain ever being achieved. This had been the career of Zamfara before the emergence of Gobir in its very heartland in the second half of the century.

In the second part of the 18th century, Gobir emerged as the most powerful state in the Rima Basin area. Previously as refugees in Zamfara, the Gobirawa grew steadily both in number and in strength. Soon they were strong enough to take to the field against both Kebbi and Adar, and in 1750 they were able to inflict a heavy defeat on Kebbi.<sup>16</sup> During the reign of Sarkin Gobir Babari (1741–69), Gobir mounted many expeditions against Kano, Katsina, Kiyawa and such distant places like Shira in Borno<sup>17</sup> each with varying degree of success. It was Sarkin Gobir Babari,

who finally destroyed the power of Zamfara, sacked its capital, Birnin Zamfara in 1762 and put Sarkin Zamfara Mairoki to flight.<sup>18</sup> With the collapse of Zamfara, Sarkin Gobir Babari built the nascent capital of Gobir, Alkalawa, on the farm lands of the Alkalin (al-Qāḍī) Zamfara from whence it got its name. During this period, Gobir was the most militaristic state in the whole of Hausaland. Though employing the same tactics and weaponry like all its neighbours, Gobir was constantly engaged in warfare right up to the end of the century when the *Jihād* movement put an end to its existence as an independent state.

### EFFECTS OF INTERNECINE WARFARE

Half a century of warfare engulfing most of Hausaland must have had serious consequences on both the state and society in the region. Constant warfare similar to that in Gobir during the late 18th century has the tendency to bring about serious dislocation in the society thereby affecting its politico-economic life as well as its peace and stability. War and instability are antithetical to the pursuance of commerce and industry that have been the life-line of Hausaland. Undoubtedly, the internecine half a century of warfare affected the prosperity of the region, and the states in the area generally turned more autocratic and arbitrary. Apart from the insecurity to which the peasantry was subjected, the subject people were over-burdened with heavy taxation and extortion by the ruling class. In Kano, for instance, Sarkin Kano Kumbari Dan Sherafa (1713–43) was said to have nearly destroyed the Kurmi Market because of his propensity for extortion. This led many merchant groups to migrate to Katsina.<sup>19</sup> The '*ulamā'*' were not spared either as he imposed taxes on them. Similarly Sarkin Kano Baba Zaki (1768–76) was very oppressive of his subjects to the extent that even the nobility, a class that had enjoyed relative security and prosperity in Hausaland, was not spared from his oppression. This class was "exploited in every way and compelled to fight"<sup>20</sup> for Sarkin Kano Baba Zaki. In Gobir, which was at the epicentre of activities in this period, life was very difficult and unbearable for the common man. Apart from heavy taxation the peasantry was forcefully conscripted, in what is popularly known as *gargadi*, to fight for the state. Failure to serve in the army was always visited with severe consequences including the forfeiture of property to the state. These were not the only aberrations or acts of iniquity taking place. Others were seizure of property of the peasantry called 'Kamuwa' by the ruling aristocracy as well as perversion of justice in favour of the rich and the strong.<sup>21</sup>

### ISLAMIC AWARENESS AMONG THE PEASANTRY

The period of these wars and turmoils coincided with a rising awareness of Islam among the peasantry. By the beginning of the 17th century indigenous Muslim scholars in the area had started composing their works on various aspects of Islamic sciences. There also had emerged, before the *Jihād*, centres like Kalamburdu, Yandoto, Katsina and, more recently, Degel, all of which were noted for their Islamic learning. A group of scholars had also kept on the itinerant tradition of Islamic learning, moving from one place to another, combing the whole length and breadth of the region. As Islamic awareness increased, these scholars became more and more critical of their society; attacking the existing dispensation with all its iniquity and un-Islamic attitude. *Shurb al-Zulāl* a poem composed by Imām Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥājj `Abd al-Raḥmān al-Barnawī in 1750 had, as its subject matter, these general acts of iniquity. In it he said:

And everything which is taken by the judge in return for his judgment, leave it, even if the judgment is lawful: do not eat it.

And the like of this is the gift of the governors, for all of it is unlawful profit from error.

And everything that is taken from a Muslim by force in the market, what is taken thus is illegal.

There is nothing which enters the belly more evil than usury. Therefore flee from it, and strive to avoid it.<sup>22</sup>

This was a direct reflection of what was going on in the society. Fifty-six years later, Shehu Usmanu Danfodiyo was to confirm, in his *Kitāb al-Farq*, these acts of oppression. In the western part of our area of study, Shaykh Jibrīl ibn `Umar embarked upon an unsuccessful *Jihād*. This shows the extent to which scholars had become restive and disenchanted with the hole set up in the region, and their desire to bring about change and reorganise the society on the basis of the *Sharīah*. What Jibrīl ibn `Umar failed to achieve was achieved some years later by one of his students, Shehu Usmanu Danfodiyo.

### THE SOKOTO *JIHĀD* MOVEMENT

The architect of the Sokoto *Jihād* Movement was Shehu Usmanu Danfodiyo. He was born in Maratta in 1754 before his family moved to Degel in the state of Gobir which became his base until his *hijrah* to Gudu in 1804. Shehu Usmanu had his early Islamic education under his father Muḥammad Fodiyo, and following the Peripatetic tradition of Islamic learning dominant in the region at the time he began to move from one master to another to gain advanced knowledge in the Islamic sciences. This took him to many places including Agades. Among his teachers was

ʿUthmān Biddurī after whom it was said the Shehu moulded himself: enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong.<sup>23</sup> Others were Muḥammad Sambo, Muḥammad Rājī, Hāshimu al-Zamfarī and Shaykh Jibrīl ibn ʿUmar, the man whom it was said had a dominant influence on Shehu, and contributed as much by his being a stimulus as by his scholarship. By his uncompromising attitude and his attack on local practices, Shaykh Jibrīl prepared the way for the Shehu.<sup>24</sup>

Shehu Usmanu began his teaching and preaching career in 1774 at the age of 20, while at the same time he was engaged in further studies. His preaching tours, apart from within the state of Gobir, his home state, took him to the neighbouring states of Kebbi and Zamfara and as far places as Illo across the river Niger. At the initial stage, he restricted his teaching and preaching to the common men or the peasantry and of course anyone who cared to attend his sessions. But as his followers and disciples grew large, he found it expedient to invite the ruling class to his preaching. It was under this consideration that he visited Sarkin Gobir Bawa and explained to him the true Islam, and asked him to observe it, and to establish justice in his land.<sup>25</sup> This gave the Shehu the opportunity to preach freely to the people without any hindrance and, as put by his brother, ʿAbd Allāh ibn Fodiyo, consequent upon this episode, the Shehu "was enabled thereby to summon (people) to religion, because it came about that those who did not fear God, feared to deny his (Shehu) order because of his connection with the Sultan".<sup>26</sup>

### SHEHU'S MOVEMENT TAKING A POLITICAL TURN

In 1788 while Shehu was in Zamfara teaching and preaching, he and other ʿulamāʾ residing in Gobir were summoned by Sarkin Gobir Bawa to Magami where he was staying to celebrate the ʿĪd al-Kabīr. After the ʿĪd-prayer, gifts of assorted variety were distributed to the ʿulamāʾ present at the occasion. Shehu Usmanu Danfodiyo rejected his own and instead requested for the following concessions: that he should be allowed to preach to people throughout the lands of Gobir; that none should be stopped from responding to his call; that anyone wearing a turban or a veil should be treated with respect; that all political prisoners be freed and that the peasantry should not be burdened with taxation. All these requests were acceded to by Sarkin Gobir Bawa.<sup>27</sup>

In this encounter Shehu Usmanu won the hearts of many people. Most of the ʿulamāʾ present during the ʿĪd al-Kabīr celebration joined the rank and file of his supporters. This also increased his prestige throughout the area, and consequently was to set the stage for future conflict with subsequent rulers of Gobir. The concessions granted to the Shehu by Sarkin Gobir Bawa were clear indications of the political dimension which

the Shehu's movement was gradually assuming. The call for the release of political prisoners and the abolition of uncanonical taxes were both social and political issues, while the wearing of turbans and veils were indicative of the distinctiveness of Shehu's followers: the *Jamā`ah*, which gradually was evolving into a separate, assertive community.

As Shehu's popularity increased and his followers proliferated, they constituted themselves into a state within a state. This became the major bane of Gobir leadership to the end and as pointed out by `Abd Allāh, "when Shehu Usmanu saw the greatness of the community, and their desire to break away from the unbelievers, and commence Holy war he began to incite them to carry arms, saying to them: 'verily to make ready weapons is sunna'".<sup>28</sup> This was in 1794/95 and coincided with the death of Sarkin Gobir Yakubu and the installation of a new Sarkin Gobir, Nafata.

The increase in the influence of Shehu and the growth of his community was alarming to the Gobir authorities. Sarkin Gobir Nafata did everything he could to contain the situation. To curtail the increasing influence and popularity of the Shehu and the growth of the community, he made a declaration which was announced throughout the state of Gobir to the effect that henceforth nobody except the Shehu would be allowed to preach to the people; those who were not born Muslims should renounce their acceptance of Islam and go back to practising their former religion; and that no man should forthwith wear turban and no woman veil her body.<sup>29</sup> These were practical measures which, if implemented, could greatly affect the fortunes of the Shehu's community. This open hostility against the Shehu and his community drew the battle-line between the two groups. But it was in the reign of Nafata's son and successor, Sarkin Gobir Yunfa, that the simmering conflict erupted.

The Gimbana crisis which was the last straw that broke the camel's back had its genesis in the reign of Sarkin Gobir Nafata. The measures taken against the Shehu's community, the *jamā`ah*, were so strict that a disciple of Shehu by the name of `Abd al-Salām was forced to leave Gobir together with his followers and settled in a town near the Zamfara river.<sup>30</sup> When Yunfa became Sarkin Gobir, he directed `Abd al-Salām to return to Gobir, an order which `Abd al-Salām ignored. With this Sarkin Gobir Yunfa felt offended and consequently prepared an expedition to make an example out of Gimbana (`Abd al-Salām's abode). Gimbana was attacked and many of `Abd al-Salām's followers were killed and others led into slavery.<sup>31</sup> The victorious Gobir army on its way back to Alkalawa passed through Degel where Shehu was living with many of his followers. This affront was too much for the Shehu's followers to stomach. The Gobir army was ambushed and the prisoners were set free by the Shehu's followers. This action infuriated Yunfa the more and, therefore, he

directed Shehu and his family to leave Degel before a retaliatory action was taken against his followers. Rather than abandon his followers, Shehu replied that he would be willing to leave Degel together with all those desiring to go with him. Thus began the famous *hijrah* embarked upon by the Shehu and his followers.<sup>32</sup>

### FIVE MAIN POINTS OF THE SHEHU

For a long time, the Shehu was preparing the minds of his followers for this eventuality. Six years before, he had begun to urge his followers to arm themselves in self-defence and in 1802 he wrote the famous *al-Masā'il al-Muhimmah* which was widely circulated. In the *Masā'il Muhimmah* five main points were made by Shehu as follows:

1. That the foundation of the religion of Islam is the application of the *Sharī'ah* law;
2. That it is incumbent upon Muslims to follow an *Imām*, or a Caliph;
3. That the *Hijrah* (Immigration) from the land of unbelief (*balad al-kufr*) to the land of Islam (*balad al-Islām*) is obligatory;
4. That those who support the unbelievers should be regarded as themselves unbelievers; and
5. That the *jihād* against the unbelievers as well as the apostates (*Murtaddūn*) is obligatory.<sup>33</sup>

It is obvious from the situation in Gobir and in fact in Hausaland generally at that time to conclude that in the *Masā'il Muhimmah* Shehu was addressing issues of utmost importance to his society. As mentioned earlier, the situation in Hausaland was anything but Islamic; the rulers had turned into autocrats, justice was subverted and in fact the *Sharī'ah* law in most cases disregarded. In some of his works like *Nūr al-Albāb* the Shehu accused Hausa rulers of heathenism. Thus when the hostility of Sarkin Gobir Yunfa became so apparent, the Shehu did what was incumbent upon him and that was the *hijrah*.

On 21st of February, 1804 Shehu Usmanu Danfodiyo embarked upon his famous *hijrah* to Gudu. Sarkin Gobir Yunfa's response to the *hijrah* was a declaration of war on the Shehu and his supporters. First, he directed that all those migrating to join the Shehu should be apprehended; in this way many of the Shehu's supporters lost either their lives or properties or both. This was followed by a military action directed against Gudu. As indicated by `Abd Allāh Fodiyo, "then the affair came to the point where they were sending armies against us, and we gathered together when that became serious, and appointed the Shaykh, who had previously been our *Imām* and our *Amīr*, as our commander, in order that he might put our affairs in order".<sup>34</sup>

The selection of Shehu Usmanu as the *Amīr al-Mu'minīn* was the final act that severed all formal relationship with the authorities in Alkalawa. The *Mujāhidūn* had now declared themselves independent of Gobir or any other authority. The Gobirawa pressed hard upon Shehu and his community at Gudu, and there were several skirmishes until the *Mujāhidūn* seized the initiative: sacking Matankari, a town whose inhabitants had on several occasions raided Shehu's community, as well as Birnin Kwanni. It was when the *Mujāhidūn* were in Kwanni that they had information that Sarkin Gobir Yunfa, at the head of a large army was on his way to attack Gudu. Thus the *Mujāhidūn* hurriedly went back to defend it.<sup>35</sup> It was then that the battle of Tafkin Kwatto took place.

The battle of Tafkin Kwatto was the major military engagement between the belligerent groups. The Gobir army was personally commanded by Sarkin Gobir Yunfa while `Abd Allāh Fodiyo was at the command of the *Mujāhidūn*. The *Mujāhidūn* were far outnumbered and ill-equipped, yet they were able to carry the day. The Gobir army was routed and Yunfa fled while the *Mujāhidūn* gathered a lot of booty. This decisive defeat was a moral booster to the *Mujāhidūn*. After the battle of Tafkin Kwatto, Shehu wrote the *Wathīqat Ahl al-Sūdān* which was widely circulated throughout Hausaland and beyond.

#### FORMAL DECLARATION OF *JIHĀD* BY THE SHEHU

The *Wathīqat Ahl al-Sūdān*, it has been said, represented the formal declaration of *jihād* by Shehu Usmanu Danfodiyo. It embodied all the major points raised in *al-Masā'il al-Muhimmah* and much more. In it, it was indicated that the status of a country is that of its ruler: If he is a Muslim his country or town is a Muslim country and if he is not so also is his country or town. It also stated that it is unlawful for Muslims to live in a non-Muslim country. That *Jihād* against non-Muslims including renegades is compulsory and the seizure of government from them is lawful.<sup>36</sup> These and similar issues raised in the *Wathīqat Ahl al-Sūdān* brought about serious agitation in the minds of many people throughout the length and breadth of Hausaland.

The victory at Tafkin Kwatto together with the impacts of the *Wathīqat Ahl al-Sūdān* increased support for the Shehu and convinced many not only of his sincerity but also certainty of victory. Many people who were sitting on the fence decided to take sides; admirers, students and disciples all flocked to Shehu's standard and swelled his army; some came to receive permission and blessing to carry on with the *Jihād* in their own localities. Rulers of the major Hausa states in the area, acting in

consonance with, and by the advice of Sarkin Gobir Yunfa stepped up pressure against Shehu's supporters and soon the whole of Hausaland was engulfed in *Jihād*.

The course which the *Jihād* took is beyond the scope of this paper. It suffices to say that Birnin Kebbi, the new capital of Kebbi, was the first to fall to the *Jihādists* in 1805. In 1807 Katsina, Daura and Kano were all taken over by the *Jihādists*, while in 1808 Alkalawa, the capital of Gobir was sacked and Sarkin Gobir Yunfa slain. With this, the centuries old Hausa dynasties were destroyed and in their places new ones came into being. The various Hausa states metamorphosed into emirates paying allegiance to Sokoto, the new capital of the Sokoto Caliphate.

The *Jihād* spread into wider areas of the Northern Nigerian area. Twice, the capital of Kanem-Borno, Ngazargamu, was sacked by the *Jihādists* and by the time a settlement was reached, a substantial part of Borno was carved into the emirates of Hadejia, Katagum and Misau. The *Jihād* led to the demise of the centuries old Sefawa dynasty and the emergence of Muḥammad al-Amīn al-Kanemī whose descendants later took over the reign of government in Borno. Al-Kanemi, a scholar of considerable standing as he was, was to engage the *Jihādists*, especially Shehu Usmanu Danfodiyo and Muhammad Bello, into a debate over a wide range of issues concerning *Jihād*, in particular on the legality of *Jihād* against Muslim states in general and Borno in particular. This debate was later documented by Muḥammad Bello in his *Infāq al-Maysūr*.

Downwards towards the Bauchi Plateau, Benue and Gongola rivers a whole chain of emirates; Bauchi, Gombe, Adamawa and Muri, emerged all under the Sokoto Caliphate. In the south west, the emirate of Nuḥe was established. The *Jihād* wars led to the collapse of the old Oyo empire and the emergence of Ibadan, Ijesha and the incorporation of its northern province of Ilorin into the Sokoto Caliphate. In most of these places the *Jihād* was continued well into the 1840s while in the metropolitan area annual military actions were being embarked upon against the remaining die-hards of Kabawa, Gobirawa and Katsinawa of Maradi. In the annual expeditions, all the emirates of the Caliphate were supposed to take part by sending a contingent under the command of the Emir. The general command of the army was often assumed by the *Amīr al-Mu'minīn* unless he delegated it to any of his lieutenants.

With the initial military action over, the various emirates were knitted together into the Sokoto Caliphate. The Caliphate was divided into two and entrusted, for administrative purposes, to `Abd Allāh Fodiyo and Muḥammad Bello, the brother and son of Shehu Usmanu Danfodiyo respectively. In the emirates, the flag bearers were confirmed in their positions as *Amīrs* while Shehu Usmanu Danfodiyo retired to Sifawa to

a life of asceticism and scholarship; producing tracts and manuals that were to serve as guides to the education, moral and political developments of the Caliphate. He died at the age of 63 in 1817.

## CONCLUSION

From the above, we can see how the efforts of a sincere person, endowed with zeal and foresight, and most importantly helped by Allah, changed the destiny of a whole region. The un-Islamic practices, political and social injustices of the then ruling class were eliminated. The revivalist movement of Shaykh `Uthmān ibn Fodiyo left an indelible mark and led to a very strong reawakening of the Muslims of this region. The influence of *Jihād* is still conspicuous and evident in the daily lives of the people of this region despite the great efforts of the British colonialists at changing the Islamic image of the present Nigerian society. The Sokoto Caliphate was defeated by the British Royal army in 1903, but after much spilling of the blood of people and after a century of consistent rule by an Islamic government. Despite that the Sultan at Sokoto is still the symbol of unity of the Muslims, not only of Nigeria, but of the whole west African sub-region.

<sup>1</sup>Popularly called Shehu Usmanu Danfodiyo (1754–1817).

<sup>2</sup>Sa`ad Abubakar, "Borno in the 19th Century", Obaro Ikime (ed.), *Groundwork of Nigerian History* (Ibadan: Heinemann Education Book Ltd., 1980), 327–8.

<sup>3</sup>John E. Lavers, "Kanem and Borno to 1808", Obaro Ikime (ed.), *Ibid.*, 208.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, 207.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, 208.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, 209; Sa`ad Abubakar, "Borno in the 19th Century", 329.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup>Sa`ad Abubakar, "Borno in the 19th Century", 329.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, 331.

<sup>13</sup>Abd al-Qādir Muṣṭafā, *Rawḍat al-Afkār*, translated by H.R. Palmer as "Western Sudan History" in *Journal of the African Society*, 15: 59, pp. 260–7; R.A. Adeleye, "Hausaland and Borno 1600–1800", J.F. Ade and Michael Crowder (eds.), *History of West Africa*, second edition (Great Britain: Longman Group Ltd, 1976), 1: 587.

<sup>14</sup>R.A. Adeleye, "Hausaland and Borno 1600–1800", 1: 587.

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*, 588.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, 589.

<sup>17</sup>Abd al-Qādir Muṣṭafā, *Rawḍat al-Afkār*, 268.

<sup>18</sup>R.A. Adeleye, "Hausaland and Borno 1600–1800", 1: 590.

<sup>19</sup>Anonymous, "Kano Chronicle", H.R. Plamers, *The Sudanese Memoirs* (London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., New Impression, 1967), 3: 124.

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*, 126.

<sup>21</sup>Shehu `Uthmān Danfodiyo, *Kitāb al-Farq*, edited and translated by Mervin Hiskett, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* (University of London), 23: 3 (1960), 558–79.

<sup>22</sup>Muḥammad ibn `Abd al-Rahmān al-Barnāwī, quoted in Thomas Hodgkin, *Nigerian Perspective* (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), 207–8.

<sup>23</sup>Abd Allāh ibn Fodiyo, *Īdāh al-Nusūkh Man Akhadhtu `anhu min al-Shuyūkh*, edited and translated by M. Hiskett as "Material Relating to the State of Learning Among the Fulani Before Their Jihad", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* (University of London), 19: 3 (1957), 563.

<sup>24</sup>Murray Last, *The Sokoto Caliphate* (Bristol: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1967), p. 6.

<sup>25</sup>Abd Allāh ibn Fodiyo, *Tazyīn al-Waraqāt*, edited and translated by M. Hiskett (Ibadan: University Press, 1963), 86.

<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>27</sup>Murray Last, *The Sokoto Caliphate*, 8.

<sup>28</sup>Abd Allāh ibn Fodiyo, *Tazyīn al-Waraqāt*, 105.

<sup>29</sup>Muḥammad Bello, *Infāq al-Maysūr fī Ta'rīkh Bilād al-Tukrūr*, C.E.J. Whitting (ed.) (London: Luzac and Co. Ltd., 1951), 67; E.J. Arnett, *The Rise of the Sokoto Fulani* (Kano: Government Printers, 1992), 48.

<sup>30</sup>Muḥammad Bello, *Sard al-Kalām fī mā Jarā Baynī wa Bayna `Abd al-Salām*, edited and translated by Muhammad Isa T/Marafa (Sokoto: Sidi Umar Press, 1982), 1.

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, 2; *Infāq al-Maysūr*, 67.

<sup>32</sup>*Infāq al-Maysūr*, 67–8; E.J. Arnett, *The Rise of the Sokoto Fulani*, 98–9.

<sup>33</sup>Shehu Usman Danfodiyo, quoted by M.A. al-Hajj, "The Writings of Shehu Uthman Dan Fodio: A Plea for Dating and Chronology", in *Kano Studies*, 1: 2 (1974/77), 11.

<sup>34</sup>Abd Allāh ibn Fodiyo, *Tazyīn al-Waraqāt*, 108.

<sup>35</sup>Muḥammad Bello, *Infāq al-Maysūr*, 72–4, Arnett, *The Rise of the Sokoto Fulani*, 54.

<sup>36</sup>Shehu Usman Danfodiyo, *Wathīqat Ahl al-Sūdān*, quoted in Ibrahim Imam, *Shehu Othman Dan Fodio* (Zaria: Gaskiya Corp., 1966), 26, 27.